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Recently, database users have begun to use cloud database services to outsource their databases. 
The reason for this is the high computation speed and the huge storage capacity that cloud owners 
provide at low prices. However, despite the attractiveness of the cloud computing environment to 
database users, privacy issues remain a cause for concern for database owners since data access is 
out of their control. Encryption is the only way of assuaging users’ fears surrounding data privacy, 
but executing Structured Query Language (SQL) queries over encrypted data is a challenging task, 
especially if the data are encrypted by a randomized encryption algorithm. Many researchers have 
addressed the privacy issues by encrypting the data using deterministic, onion layer, or 
homomorphic encryption. Nevertheless, even with these systems, the encrypted data can still be 
subjected to attack. In this research, we first propose an indexing scheme to encode the original 
table’s tuples into bit vectors (BVs) prior to the encryption. The resulting index is then used to 
narrow the range of retrieved encrypted records from the cloud to a small set of records that are 
candidates for the user’s query. Based on the indexing scheme, we then design three different 
models to execute SQL queries over the encrypted data. The data are encrypted by a single 
randomized encryption algorithm, namely the Advanced Encryption Standard AES-CBC. In each 
proposed scheme, we use a different (secure) method for storing and maintaining the index values 
(BVs) (i.e., either at user’s side or at the cloud server), and we extend each system to support most 
of relational algebra operators, such as select, join, etc. Implementation and evaluation of the 
proposed systems reveals that they are practical and efficient at reducing both the computation and 
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In the contemporary electronic era, both individuals and organizations need scalable data storage 
and high-performance computing units to process and store their data. Historically, only large 
organizations/ companies have been able to own such units, as they were not affordable for most 
individuals and small companies. With the rise of cloud computing, however, this problem has 
been solved, as users can now rent storage and computational units as needed at an affordable 
price. Most cloud providers provide databases as a service, which allow individual users and 
companies to outsource their data and access them at any time, from any location. According to 
the report in [1], the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of cloud database market is anticipated 
to be 46.78% in 2023 [Figure 1.1]. However, given that privacy breaches are one of the most 
common threats in the cloud computing environment, many people have expressed concerns about 
privacy when outsourcing sensitive data. For instance, untrustworthy cloud service providers 
might steal personal customer information—such as email addresses, mailing addresses, and phone 
numbers—and sell that information to third parties, who can then use it to send irritating 
advertisements to users via email, mail, and telephone.  
More importantly, attackers who target a cloud provider can gain access to customers’ 
sensitive personal information, such as social security numbers (SSNs). This has serious 
consequences, as criminals can use these data to impersonate customers in situations such as 
financial transactions (e.g., telephone banking). Thus, sensitive data are restricted from being 
processed or sold to a third party. Therefore, significant evolutions in the cloud computing 
environment could make such services unattractive to consumers if changes occur without also 
providing appropriate solutions for privacy breach issue. Such an issue must be tackled if cloud 
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providers are to gain the trust of users and organizations so that they will outsource sensitive data 
without worrying about data leakages. 
Data encryption effectively solves the problem of privacy breaches by ensuring that cloud 
providers cannot learn from the data they store. The easiest way is to encrypt the entire table and 
outsource it.  Then to process a query, the entire table must be retrieved and decrypted. However, 
the application of this technique conflicts with purpose of the databases and the critical 
functionalities of cloud environments (e.g., searching). Other researchers have used a proxy (i.e., 
a trusted third-party server), rather than the user, as an additional component to carry out the 
encryption and decryption processes. To make this approach practical, each datum must be 
encrypted with more than one encryption algorithm to support various query types [2]. However, 
in the case of very large data sets, this approach comes with the penalty of a significant 
computational burden, as each datum might be decrypted more than once. Various researchers  




have proposed numerous systems using different encryption techniques to protect data 
confidentiality. In the following subsection, we explore the common encryption algorithms that 
have been adopted in state-of-the-art research on cloud database security. 
1.1 Encryption Algorithms  
1.1.1 Order-Preserving Encryption 
Order-preserving encryption (OPE) is a functional encryption technique to encrypt data such that 
range queries (e.g., maximum, minimum, and inequality operators) can be implemented on 
encrypted data without encrypting the operands or decrypting the data [3], [4]. This type of 
encryption uses a function to compare the order of the ciphertexts to allow comparison operations 
of the encrypted numeric data. This type of algorithm preserves the original data order. For 
example, if c1 is the ciphertext of m1, and c2 is the ciphertext of m2, then the comparison of c1 and 
c2 is as follows: 
(c1 < c2  if  m1 < m2  ); (c1 > c2  if  m1 > m2 ); or (c1 = c2  if  m1 = m2) 
The security of this type of encryption is downgraded if the adversary infers the ciphertext of a 
certain plaintext. Also, this type of encryption is vulnerable to inference attacks as in [5], [6]. 
1.1.2 Deterministic Encryption 
In deterministic encryption (DE) schemes, given the encryption key k and the messages m, the 
ciphertext of m is always the same when encrypted with k, even in multiple executions of DE. 
While DE can be used in keyword searches, it does not preserve the order if used with numeric 
values. AES-SIV is an example of a deterministic algorithm. DE is widely used in securing cloud 
databases. However, privacy can be compromised in this scheme if the attacker is able to identify 
the ciphertext of a certain plaintext word (e.g., if he establishes the ciphertext of “Alice,” then he 
is able to determine which tuples contain “Alice”). 
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1.1.3 Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption (HOM) is a method of encryption that allows for the performance of 
certain arithmetic operations (i.e., addition and multiplication) on ciphertexts without the need to 
decrypt them. There are two types of HOM: partially HOM and fully HOM. Partially HOM 
supports either addition or multiplication, while fully HOM supports both operations. HOM can 
secure numeric data in cloud environments; however, encrypting with HOM produces long 
ciphertexts, since this type of encryption is based on an asymmetric encryption system. Also, 
computation performance on HOM ciphertexts is downgraded as the volume of ciphertexts 
increases [7]. 
1.1.4 Randomized Encryption  
Randomized encryption intends to produce different ciphertexts for each plaintext, i.e., no more 
than one ciphertext has the same plaintext. Essentially, in this scheme, in addition to the secret 
key, an initialization vector (IV) must be XORed with the first block of the plaintext, and a new 
ciphertext must therefore be obtained each time the algorithm is executed [8]. While this 
encryption technique provides the highest security level for outsourced databases, it has a major 
drawback in cloud databases—namely, the inability to execute SQL queries over ciphertexts. 
1.1.5 Onion Encryption 
The term “onion layers encryption” was first developed by the authors in [2]. In onion encryption, 
cloud servers are able to execute different SQL statements while data remain secret. In the onion 
encryption, each layer is a ciphertext of a specific encryption methodology (e.g., DET, OPE, HOM, 
or RAN). The inner layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the lowest security level, while 
the outer layer is the ciphertext with the highest security level (i.e., randomized). The main flaw 
of this approach is the intensive computation that results from decrypting all of the encryption 
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layers, which leads to slower query processing. In addition, the space required for the encrypted 
databases is about 3.75 times that required for the unencrypted databases [2]. 
1.2 Summary of Contributions  
In this dissertation, we first designed a novel indexing scheme for randomized encrypted databases, 
which is based on defining a partitioning tree (PT) for all domain partitions for sensitive columns 
in a table (i.e., dividing each column into sub-columns where each sub-column represents a set of 
values). The PT is then used to encode records into bit vectors (BVs), wherein each bit position is 
mapped to a specific partition and is only set to one if the value belongs to the set of values 
represented by that partition. The BVs are used to retrieve only part of the outsourced encrypted 
records. Second, we suggested three secure prototypes based on our proposed indexing technique. 
In each model, we use a different method of storing and handling the BVs (either on a private 
cloud server or on a third-party cloud server). Third, for each system, we proposed different 
algorithms to process most of the relational algebra operators on encrypted data without revealing 
the confidentiality of data. Fourth, we conducted several experiments to evaluate different aspects 
of the proposed systems—including, but not limited to, time overhead and space overhead—-
against three well-known approaches: CryptDB [2], columns-based fragmentation [9], and one 
block-based encryption [10]. Our experiments showed that the proposed systems outperformed 
most of the competing approaches in both time and space overhead. 
The rest of this document is organized as follow: in section 2, we explain different security 
enforcement schemes for the cloud databases, then we survey the state-of–the-art approaches to 
secure outsourced databases. Section 3 details the proposed systems in this dissertation, followed 
by the implementation and evaluation details in section 4. Finally, we provided a conclusion of 
this dissertation and discussed some of the future work in section 5.   
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2 Related Work 
The powerful features of the cloud computing environment—such as enormous capacity and high-
performance computing units—have attracted database owners in both small and large companies. 
These features have made it necessary to obtain and maintain the incredibly expensive storage and 
computation units to process vast databases at affordable prices. In spite of the advantages of cloud 
computing, data security is the main drawback of using cloud services to outsource databases. The 
work of securing databases began when networking and internet technology advanced and were 
adopted by major companies. This, in turn, fueled the need for databases as a service for 
individuals and entities requiring high storage capacity and computation. Data privacy, integrity, 
and confidentiality are in danger when databases are outsourced, since the database owner loses 
control over who can access and read their data.  
To address these issues, researchers began to develop various approaches to protect user data 
from unauthorized access and data breaches, using data access control, data encryption, or both 
[11], [12]. Data access control functions by regulating what object O a subject S can access and 
what operations Op that S can perform on O. Encryption, in contrast, works by encoding plaintext 
data into ciphertext (i.e., an unreadable format). Each method has its advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, access control is intended to increase computing performance, while 
encryption decreases it. In addition, encryption protects against data breaches from both internal 
and external attacks, whereas data privacy can be compromised in such cases when the access 
control mechanism is enforced, since adversaries might bypass predefined access roles to access 
data. Regardless of the heavy computational work required by encryption schemes, encryption is 
still the preferred security mechanism for most database users.  
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2.1 Security Issues in Cloud Computing  
Despite the powerful features of cloud computing, there are many issues and vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited by malicious actors against outsourced data. One type of security issues—
privileges abuse—involves the use of legitimate privileges for malicious purposes (e.g., a user in 
company A with the privilege to view company A’s sales records who uses their privileges to fetch 
sales tuples and pass them to competitor company B). Another vulnerability in the cloud 
environment occurs when a user is assigned privileges that exceed what is necessary to perform 
their job. This can create a potential threat if such privileges are abused, either by the user or an 
attacker compromising the user’s account. Cloud environments may also be vulnerable to SQL 
injection, i.e., injecting SQL queries to act against the objective of an application. The injected 
SQL statement is inserted into an executable statement which, in turn, can fetch data that the 
attacker wants to obtain (e.g., injecting a query to retrieve all of the records in a given table). 
Malicious insider attacks are a form of attacks that are performed from inside the cloud 
organization, with very little chance of detection. The attacker can access sensitive data and leak 
or maliciously process them in a way that violates system policies. 
A data breach is defined as the accessing or obtaining of sensitive information—such as 
medical records, student information, employees’ salaries, and so on—in an unauthorized manner. 
Such problems occur when data access is not restricted and when API access control is weak. 
Other cloud attacks may exploit the following: weak authentication; unpatched services; or 
insecure system architecture (e.g., keeping sensitive and non-sensitive data in the same database 
without implementing any form of encryption for the sensitive data).  
One solution to concerns about the above-mentioned vulnerabilities is applying data 
encryption to the sensitive data. For example, in an SQL injection attack, if the attacker injects a 
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query to fetch the entire set of the database, the attacker will learn nothing if the sensitive data are 
encrypted. However, security level differs by the type of encryption used. Weak encryption 
techniques can be compromised by cryptographic attacks, which exploit a vulnerability in the 
cryptographic, such as a weakness in a cipher, key management scheme, code, or cryptographic 
protocol. In this dissertation, we focus on encryption strategy as a method of protecting data from 
the cloud database vulnerabilities listed above. In the next sub-section, we survey the most popular 
encryption schemes that have been used by state-of-the-art database security systems in the field 
of cloud computing. 
2.2 Encryption-Based Solutions to Protect Cloud Databases 
Encryption is defined as encoding plaintext into unreadable formats, which preserves the 
confidentiality and privacy of the data. There are two types of encryptions: symmetric and 
asymmetric. In symmetric encryption, only one encryption key (i.e., the secret key sk) is used to 
encrypt and decrypt the data. The sk is known by both the encryptor and decryptor entities; 
however, it must be kept secret. The most popular symmetric encryption algorithms are the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Blowfish algorithms. In [13], the authors conducted a 
comparative analysis of the AES and Blowfish algorithms and found that AES was faster than 
Blowfish by nearly 200 ms when used to encrypt or decrypt the same file. Asymmetric encryption, 
on the other hand, involves using two keys—a public key and a private key—to encrypt and 
decrypt the data. To guarantee confidentiality, the receiver’s public key is used to encrypt the data, 
while the private key, associated with the receiver’s public key, is the only key used in the 
decryption process and must be kept secret. Asymmetric encryption systems are computationally 
intensive and slow down the encryption and decryption processes [14]. Some examples of well-
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known asymmetric encryption systems include RSA, ElGamal, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC. For 
more details about asymmetric encryption algorithms, see [15], [16], and [17].  
When choosing an encryption system, a variety of factors must be considered, including 
security level, computation overhead, and complexity, among others. For instance, the 
computation overhead of asymmetric encryption is higher than that of symmetric encryption 
because, in an asymmetric system, the usage of CPU cycles is higher than in a symmetric scheme. 
Moreover, the security level in both systems differs based on the type of algorithm used (e.g., 
randomized algorithms are more secure than deterministic algorithms) and whether a strong sk was 
used to encrypt the data. In a symmetric system, the security level is high, and the chance of 
compromising the sk (for, e.g., a sk length of 256 bits in AES) is virtually nonexistent. Accordingly, 
symmetric algorithms are more widely used than asymmetric algorithms. 
Data encryption is the only solution for protecting outsourced databases that prevents data 
leakage resulting from any form of unauthorized data access in the cloud. However, it is 
challenging to execute SQL queries over encrypted databases. The existing literature on cloud 
database security offers a variety of techniques to overcome this problem and deal with outsourced 
encrypted databases. While most state-of-the-art systems aim to provide security, efficiency (i.e., 
time required to execute SQL queries) varies depending on the technique used; the higher security 
level provided, the lower performance level achieved. In the following subsection, we explore each 
strategy used to deal with outsourced encrypted databases. We then review the research offering 
solutions within each strategy.   
2.3 Current Approaches to Process SQL Queries over Encrypted Databases 
Early attempts to secure databases encrypted the whole database, with each record encrypted as 
one block (e.g., if a table has four sensitive columns before encryption, the encrypted table will 
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have just one column to store the encrypted values). However, as mentioned earlier, problems 
occur when SQL queries must be executed over the encrypted data. The simplest solution to this 
matter is to fetch the entire outsourced table and decrypt it, then execute the query. While this 
approach can work well for small databases, it suffers from higher computation costs when applied 
to larger databases (e.g., a table holding millions of records).   
Researchers have proposed numerous solutions to avoid retrieving entire outsourced 
encrypted databases by classifying records into categories before proceeding to the encryption 
process. The encrypted table will have an additional column(s) to store the category of the record. 
By using these categories, the end-user is able to retrieve only part of the encrypted data. In 
addition, the amount of fetched encrypted tuples is impacted by how data are categorized in the 
cloud (i.e., the more data categories there are, the fewer data are fetched). To address the issue of 
categorizing data, many authors (e.g., [18]–[20]) have proposed approaches to dividing attributes 
into categories that can be used to query encrypted data. The techniques are based on dividing each 
attribute into ranges. The main encrypted table in the cloud will then have additional attributes—
as many as the number of partitions among all attributes—to hold numeric values. The whole 
record will then be encrypted as one block and stored as an attribute value in the cloud. The early 
attempts technique was developed by [10], who proposed different techniques to execute relational 
algebra operators over the encrypted records. Their solution assigned an identifier for each value 
in the tuple, then used those identifiers to retrieve only encrypted records whose identifiers 
matched the requested identifier. Nevertheless, there are several limitations to using such an 
approach, including vulnerability to statistical attacks, as mentioned in [21], and heavy client-side 
computation due to decrypting every retrieved record’s data (because all the fields of each record 
are encrypted as one block). The authors in [22] proposed a system to build an index for the plain 
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data, then encrypt each page of the index individually. To execute a query, the corresponding page 
is loaded and decrypted. However, since all pages are encrypted with one key, the security of this 
scheme is downgraded. In addition, the size of the index will continue to grow, which could impact 
performance. To improve the security level, a unique encryption key could be used to encrypt each 
page of the index. In [21], the researchers suggested building a B-tree index, maintained on the 
client-side, over the plaintext data. In [23], the authors introduced a single values level encrypted 
index and suggested splitting the index into sub-indexes, i.e., each sub-index is for encrypted 
values using the same key in the column. The authors in [24] proposed a none–order-preserving 
index for the encrypted database. This index does not require interaction with the user once the 
query is submitted. The security of this scheme is higher than that of models based on order-
preserving indexes, which may be vulnerable to statistical attacks. Hahn et al. [25]  propose a 
system to join encrypted databases. The idea is based on applying a selection operation first, then 
enforce the join over selected data. That only leaks the frequency of use and access patterns. This 
method is interesting; however, the delay is high because of the asymmetric cryptosystem they 
use.    
In [2], Popa et al. developed CryptDB as the first practical system for executing Standard 
Query Language (SQL) queries over encrypted databases. Two attack scenarios were addressed 
using onion layers encryption: cloud attack and proxy attack. Each datum is encrypted by more 
than one encryption algorithm in which the outer layer ciphertexts produced by a randomized 
encryption algorithm. CryptDB uses a proxy to perform the crypto operations for the user. One of 
the drawbacks of CryptDB is that, because of the excessive crypto operations and many layers of 
decryption, it introduces a high computational burden. In addition, because it is challenging to 
execute an analytical load to encrypted data on a server, CryptDB was improved in [26] to support 
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complex queries and large data sets. MONOMI solves this problem by splitting the execution into 
two sets:  a set of queries to outsourced encrypted data and a set to be executed on decrypted data 
on the user’s side. Authors in [27] proposed an enhanced version of CryptDB to accelerate query 
processing. Instead of using AES, they used AES-NI, which was reflected in the speed of the query 
processing time. They also suggested improvements to the hardware to accelerate query processing 
in CryptDB. There are many different systems proposed on top of CryptDB, such as the one 
presented in [28].  
Liu et al. [29] proposed a fully homomorphic order-preserving encryption system (FHOPE) 
to execute complex SQL queries over encrypted numeric data. This system allows cloud providers 
to run arithmetic and comparison operators over encrypted data without repeating the encryption, 
thus helping to resist homomorphic order-preserving attacks. The downside of that study is that 
the authors conducted their experiments using tables with less than 9,000 records. For improved 
measuarment of the efficiency and scalability of this system, the tables should have more records 
(e.g., 100,000 or more). A variety of studies related to this system are provided in references [30]–
[34]. 
Cui et al. proposed P-McDb [35], a privacy-preserving search approach that allows users 
to execute queries over encrypted data. To avoid inference attack, this system requires two cloud 
servers, one for database re-randomizing and shuffling and one for data storing and searching. 
Instead of a total search, P-McDb supports partial searches of encrypted records that are described 
as a sub-linear manner. Further, P-McDb is a multi-user system. In the case of a user revocation, 
the data cannot be re-encrypted. Another limitation of this system is that communication with two 
cloud providers will add more latency when compared to other systems such as those described in 
[2]. More proposed systems related to P-McDb are described in references [9], and [36]–[39]. 
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Osama et al., in [40], proposed different approaches for partitioning attributes of tables into 
multiple sub-columns based on the attribute’s domain values. The methods were tested and 
introduced various delays. They use an order-preserving mapping function, which enables cloud 
servers to run different types of SQL-queries. The major disadvantage of this research is that only 
attributes with numeric values but not with string values were considered. Moreover, such a system 
only supports select statements. 
In [41], the researchers proposed a secure database (SDB) approach, a system that divides 
data into sensitive and non-sensitive, with only sensitive data being encrypted. The initial idea was 
to split the sensitive data into two shares. The data owner (DO) keeps one share, and the second 
share is kept by the cloud service provider (CSP). Assuming the CSP is curious, the CSP can learn 
nothing from its share unless it obtains the DO’s share. Also, the SDB allows different operators 
to share the same encryption, thus providing secure query processing with data interoperability. 
Similar studies can be found in [26], [42], and [43]. 
As presented in [44], some researchers used a technique called “Bucketization,” in which 
the tuples are mapped to more than one bucket. This technique enables a “database as a service” 
(DAS) server to execute SQL-style queries over encrypted data. Each bucket contains a set of 
encrypted records ranging from the minimum to maximum value and assigned an identification 
(ID). Several studies based on this approach have been conducted [45]–[48]. 
Some researchers ([35], [49], [50]) have addressed cloud database privacy by adopting 
what is called a hybrid cloud. The technique is based on dividing data into sensitive and non-
sensitive. Then, the sensitive data or attributes are outsourced to the user’s private cloud while the 
non-sensitive data are migrated to the public cloud. The problem is that, because most users 
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consider their data to be sensitive, this scheme is not practical for users of non-sensitive data. Also, 
the complexity of integration for this solution is high.  
On the other hand, Amjad et al. [9] proposed a technique to prevent untrusted and 
suspicious cloud service providers from being able to learn from private data. This technique is 
based on vertical fragmentation, in which each sensitive encrypted column is outsourced to a 
different cloud server (slave cloud). In contrast, while the whole encrypted table is stored at the 
central server (master cloud). Because the encryption algorithms [2] and the proxy were used in 
this system, the proxy performed all the work of interpreting queries, encryption, and decryption. 
One of the limitations of this work is more communication delays, especially if the query condition 
contains more than one clause. Another example of research that uses this technique is [51].  
Bouganim et al. [52] introduced a hardware/software system to address the problem of 
confidentiality leakage in the outsourced databases. The idea is that the user maintains and controls 
a mediator smartcard that is plugged in on the side. This smartcard is responsible for encrypting 
the data before putting them into the database and decrypting data before sending them to the user. 
The major disadvantage of this technique is that the user is limited by the capacity of the smartcard 
and cannot benefit from the storage provided by the cloud services. Similar studies can be found 
in [52]–[54]. 
SafeBox [55] is a system based on an approach called access security broker (CASB). This 
approach allows users to search and share encrypted data while protecting sensitive information 
from being leaked if an attacker gains access to the cloud server (CS). This technique can be 
applied over encrypted databases or files and supports keyword-based searches within the 
encrypted contents. Several studies that use CASB can be found in [56] and [57]. Also, a detailed 





The primary goal of this research is to address the significant drawbacks of some of the state-of-
the-art research in the field of cloud database security. They are described below. 
Onion layers encryption means encrypting each datum using different encryption 
algorithms. The inner layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the lowest security level, while 
the outer layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the highest security level (i.e., randomized 
encryption algorithm) [2]. When it comes to search for a value, the whole column’s values must 
be updated to the next layer (take off layers) This process might be executed more than once to 
achieve the desired result. For a large encrypted table, more excessive crypto operations are 
performed, leading to substantial computational overhead. To enable the cloud server to remove 
and adjust layers, the secret key is passed to the server, making the system vulnerable to an in-
session attack. Also, the trusted but curious cloud provider(s) could learn about the data if the 
security layer is adjusted to a low-security level layer. To overcome this limitation, our proposed 
approaches are designed to encrypt each datum in the table using only a randomized encryption 
algorithm (AES-CBC). Also, we fetch only those encrypted rows from the cloud server that are 
related to the query of the user, which reduces undesirable computations. We eliminate passing 
the secret keys to the cloud server to ensure that curious cloud provider(s) cannot learn from the 
outsourced database.  
In systems that use vertical fragmentation (i.e., column-based fragmentation), the table is 
fragmented throughout a multi-cloud. So, each column is outsourced to a different cloud to 
preserve privacy and speed up the query processing [9]. This approach might be practical for tables 
that have a few attributes but not for tables that have hundreds of attributes. The reason is because 
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the table owner must have multiple accounts with more than one cloud server. If two or more cloud 
providers collude, privacy will be compromised.  
Communication delay is another concern when using such systems. To address this issue, 
the developed systems require only one server to outsource the encrypted table, a feature that will 
minimize communication costs, improve privacy, and accelerate query processing.  
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a technique in which SQL queries can be executed over 
the ciphertexts as if the data were not encrypted. HE is used to encrypt only numeric values and 
support arithmetic operators over encrypted numeric data. However, the space required to store 
the ciphertexts is too large. Also, the integrity of encrypted data is not preserved in such systems 
because the attacker can change the ciphertexts undetected. To date, this type of encryption 
supports only addition and multiplication over encrypted digital data. To overcome this, we use a 
symmetric randomized algorithm AES-CBC to preserve integrity because the modification of a 
ciphertext leads to an incorrect decryption result.  
3.2 Encryption Strategy  
To provide privacy and a high level of security, all of our approaches used AES-CBC to encrypt 
sensitive data. Only the query manager (QM) keeps and maintains the secret keys (SKs). We used 
a symmetric algorithm rather than an asymmetric algorithm to gain a higher level of security and 
faster crypto processing. 
3.3 The Query Manager (QM) 
In our work [59]–[61], we defined the query manager (QM) as a trusted server that resides in an 
organization’s or company’s private cloud. It works as an intermediary between users and the 
Cloud and is responsible for processing queries and encoding BVs for each table (we explain this 
step in detail in the discussion of partitioning trees). Also, the proposed prototypes support 
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individuals’ cases in which QM would be light software residing in the end user’s system. For an 
organization, it performs the same functions as the QM server. While we assume that the user can 
encrypt only columns that have sensitive data, the proposed approaches even support encrypting 
all of a table’s attributes.  
3.4 Partitioning Tree (PT) 
As stated in our previous studies [59-61], the PT is the primary element of all proposed systems in 
which the query is appropriately rewritten for execution by the cloud server. The owner of the 
table participates in the construction of the PT by specifying which columns are sensitive and 
should be encrypted. Then, the table owner defines the possible partitions for each column and 
indicates whether the partitions are ranges of values or non-ranges of values. Thus, the values in 
each column are partitioned into multi-partitions in which each partition includes a set of values. 
Then, the QM builds the PT based on these specifications. As shown in Figure 3.1., the name of 
the table is the root of the tree, and the second-level nodes are the sensitive columns that have to 
be encrypted. Nodes in the third level, each of which is assigned an ID, represent the partitions of 
all the sensitive columns.  
Table 3.1 The Students Table 
ID Name SSN VisaType Department 
01 Alice 12701 J-1 MATH 
02 Ryan 25678 F-2 BUSN 
03 Mark 46932 F-1 CSCI 




The second-level nodes are assigned a color of either white or gray. Gray nodes imply that the 
partitions of the column are ranges of values (e.g., the Name column must have range partitions 
based on the first letter of the name, while students Visa Type have non-range partitions, such as 
F-1, F-2, etc.). The PT is stored locally in the QM. We encourage the data owner to define as many 
as possible partitions for each SC, which can narrow the range of retrieved encrypted records from 
the outsourced table and, in turn, increase the performance of the proposed systems, and achieve 
faster query processing.  
We are not concerned about memory consumption in our solutions because the sensitive 
information in every row is encoded into bits (i.e., the smallest computation unit).  Based on the 
PT, this does not consume memory or searching time. In section 3.6, we explain in detail how and 
where to store bit vectors in each proposed system. Algorithm 1 shows how the QM constructs the 





Figure 3.1 An example of the partitioning tree (PT) of the students table (Table 3.1) 
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Algorithm1: PT construction 
1: Input: file.txt containing the name of the table, sensitive columns, and partitions. 
2: Create a tree and add a node, represent the table name (TN), as the root of the tree.  
3: Int Id=0 
4: For each sensitive column SCi  
5:        Nodei = TN.addchild (‘the name of the SCi’) 
6:        If SCi contains range of values 
7:               Nodei.AssignColor (‘Gray’) 
8:       Else 
9:               Nodei.AssignColor (‘White’) 
10:      While (partitions! = null) 
11:              Nodej = Nodei.addchild(‘partition value’) 
 
3.5 Encoding Approach 
The encoding process is an essential step in the proposed systems. The proposed scheme is used 
to encode records’ sensitive data into bit vectors (BVs), which can be exploited to retrieve the 
required encrypted records (i.e., candidate records for the user's query without the need for 
decrypting data). The QM parses each record to get the names of the sensitive columns and their 
values. It then uses the PT to encode the tuples before proceeding to the encryption process, to bit 
vectors (BVs). Each bit position in the BV is mapped to a partition node from the third level nodes 
(e.g., the first bit in the BV is mapped to the node having the ID =1). The encoding process is 
accomplished as follows: 
1) For each record Rj in the main table T, the QM creates a BV having a length equal to the 
number of nodes in the third level of the corresponding PT. It then initializes all its bits to 




2) For each record Rj, the bit bm that mapped to the partition node PNm under SCi is set to one 
if the datum equals the values represented by PNm. Then, the QM assigns an index to the 
newly created BV.  
For the sake of clarity, the encoded BVs of the records in Table 3.1 are as follows:  
 
How and where to store the BVs differs for each proposed system. In section 3.6, for each 
prototype, we present the details of how and where to store the BVs (i.e., either locally at the QM 
or by migrating them to the cloud server). We also discuss the security and the potential threats in 
each model and show how to solve them. Algorithm 2 delineates the process of the encoding step. 
Algorithm 2:  Encoding algorithm 
1: Define a vector V 
2: For each record Rj in Table T 
 Parse Rj to get the value(s) of the sensitive columns SCs 
3: Define a bit vector BVj of length n where n = the number of nodes in the 3
rd  
level of the T 
4: For each SCi in Rj 
5: If value v = value of the nth sub-node of the SCi OR v ∈ value of the nth 
sub-node of SCi 
6:           Set nth bit in BVj to 1 
7:                 Else  
8:           Set nth bit in BVj to 0 











3.6 Developed Prototypes  
3.6.1 Bit Vectors as a Matrix (BVM) 
In this section, we discuss the model that uses bit verctors as a matrix. Some passages, figures, 
tables, and algorithms presented in subsections (3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2) have been quoted verbatim 
from our published work in  [59]. 
3.6.1.1 System Description 
In this prototype, we store and process the BVs of each outsourced table locally at the QM. We 
assume that the QM is a trusted server residing in either the end user’s machine as an application 
or in the private cloud (Figure 3.3). Because the only thing outsourced in this prototype is the 
encrypted table, the highest level of security is provided. The outsourced encrypted table preserves 
the structure of the original table. However, we add a column (used as a foreign key) to store the 
rows’ indices (during the encoding process, the QM assigns a unique index number to every 
encrypted row and its BV). Further, we need these indices to fetch the encrypted records. To 
process a query, the QM needs to load the BVs to the main memory from the hard disk drive 
(HDD) and perform a rapid look-up to find which records are candidates for the user’s query. 
Then, it pushes their indices into a list and rewrites the query to fetch any record whose index is 
on the list.  In the following sub-sections, we present the supported statements for the relational 
algebraic operations. 
3.6.1.2 Basic Operations  
The basic operations in database applications are insert, select, update, alter, and delete 
statements. We extended this prototype to support these operations, as explained below.  
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Insertion statements are straightforward. The QM receives the insert query, creates a new 
BV for the newly inserted record, appends it to the corresponding bit vectors matrix (BVM), and 
then encrypts sensitive data and sends it to the Cloud. 
Select is an essential statement in all database applications. In our approach, it is also part 
of the execution of other statements like update and delete. In the QM, the process of executing 
the select statement algorithm is to check which of the following cases is applicable and then 
enforce it.  
Case 1: None of the column(s) in the query condition is sensitive, so they are not stored in 
encrypted form in the Cloud. In this case, the QM directly searches and retrieves the data 
corresponding to the query condition from the Cloud. For example, in Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, and 
Figure 3.2,  if the query condition is “WHERE ID = 03”, the QM retrieves the records directly 
from the Cloud that satisfy this condition.  
 Case 2: All column(s) in the query condition are sensitive, so they are stored in encrypted 
form in the Cloud. In this case, for each column that appears in the query condition, the QM 
retrieves the indices of corresponding bit vector(s) (BVs) from the BVM. Then it performs logical 
 
Figure 3.3 BVM Architecture. 
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AND/OR operations based on conditions among indexes returned for each column. For example, 
if the query condition is “Name = Mark AND visa type = F1”, the QM will find any BV having 
the bit that mapped to the node representing the values of the PD “Q-Z.” Because “Mark” belongs 
to this group (i.e., PD “Q-Z”), any BV has the bit mapped to this partition is set to one will be 
added to a list L[].  The QM will do the same for visa type, then perform the logical operation 
AND between the two lists and rewrite the query accordingly to fetch the candidate records.    
Algorithm 3: select  
1: Receive user query < Table name, List of columns {c1, c2, c3 …}, list of values {v1, 
v2, v3 …}> 
2: Check query columns used in search condition  
3: CASE 1: 
4: If none of columns mentioned in query is sensitive 
5:         Search the corresponding table in cloud 
6: Return data. 
7: CASE 2: 
8: If each column Ci is sensitive  
9:  For each value v being searched for under column Ci 
10: Search the column representing that domain value in PT then for each BVj 
entry under domain value in Ci  
11: If bit =1 
12: Add the index of BVj to List Li [ ] 
13: Define list F where F [ ] is the final list that contains the indices from the lists ( L1 [ 
], L2 [ ],…, Li [ ])  after performing AND or OR (based on query conditions) 
operations between them. 
14: Return F 
15: Retrieve encrypted records from the cloud based on the list F [ ]. 
16: Decrypt and return data  
17: CASE 3: 
18: If mixed columns (Sensitive and Non-sensitive)   
19:      Do Case 1 AND   Case 2    
20:      Remove duplication if found 




The update process is one of the functions provided by the QM. Through this function, the 
user issues a query to update record(s). The QM identifies record(s) using our select algorithm. 
Then based on the results of select algorithm, the QM issues a query to retrieve encrypted record(s) 
from the Cloud, decrypts them to find the exact records that match the query conditions, and issues 
a query to update the encrypted record and its BV. The steps are shown in Algorithm 4. 
 
Algorithm 4: update  
1: Receive user query < Table name, List of columns {c1, c2, c3 …}, List of values {v1, 
v2, v3 …}> 
2: Use search Algorithm (Algorithm 3) to find the candidate record(s) 
3: Fetch the record(s) from the encrypted table 
4: Decrypt and find the exact record(s) 
5: For each update value uv in record Rj  
6:        If uv falls under non-sensitive column 
7: Update the old value with uv in the outsourced table 
8: If uv falls under a sensitive column SCi 
9: For each SCi in the update query 
10: If the uv falls under a PD other than the previous PD  
11: Set the bit that mapped to this PD to 1 and unset the 
rest of bits that mapped to other PDs for this SCi.. 
12: Encrypted the updated values  
13: Send data back to the cloud 
 
 
The delete process is used to delete a record from a table. In this case, the QM uses the 
search algorithm to find the candidate record(s), then removes the record(s) from the outsourced 
encrypted table and deletes the corresponding BVs from the BVM. Algorithm 5 outlines the steps 
in the deletion process. 
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Algorithm 5: delete  
1: Use Algorithm 3 (select algorithm) to find the required record.  
2: Add the index of each fetched record satisfying the delete condition into list L []. 
3: Generate a delete query to delete any record from the outsourced encrypted table its 
index is in L []. 
3: Delete the BVs of the deleted records from the corresponding BVM.  
 
Alter is one of the fundamental operations in any database that allows users to drop/add 
columns from/to relations. However, in this model, the QM first determines whether the dropped 
or added column is a sensitive column. In the case of “drop,” the QM will look at the corresponding 
partitioning tree (PT) and drop all partition nodes of the predecessor node that represents the 
dropped column. It then deletes all bits mapped to the deleted nodes from the BVM. The QM then 
forwards the alter query to the Cloud, which will execute the query to drop the encrypted column. 
In the “add column” case, the QM asks the user if the column is sensitive. If it is sensitive, then it 
will add it with its partitions to the PT after receiving information from the user. 
3.6.1.3 Relational Algebra Operators 
3.6.1.3.1 Join  
Most current research in database security does not support the join operator because dealing with 
encrypted databases it is not a straightforward task, especially if AES-CBC is the encryption 
algorithm. The simple solution for such a task is to retrieve all encrypted tables from the Cloud 
and perform the join operator after decrypting them. However, this is not the optimal choice when 
it comes to massive tables. In this model, to avoid unnecessary computation, we need to move as 
much of the join computation as possible to the cloud site without decrypting data, leaving minimal 
work for the QM. To make BVM both practical and efficient in the join operator, we need to 
consider the following cases for the join condition:  
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1) The join condition has only non-sensitive columns. 
2) The join condition involves only sensitive columns having limited distinct value partitions 
such as USA visa types. 
3) The join condition contains only sensitive columns that have range partitions such as salary. 
4) The join condition has at least two of the previous cases. So, we design an algorithm to 
enable the cloud provider to implement a join operator over encrypted tuples without 
decrypting the encrypted attributes.  
To solve the first case, in which the join condition involves only non-sensitive attributes (i.e., 
unencrypted attributes), the QM will first determine if the attributes are sensitive or not. If they are 
non-sensitive, it will forward the query to the cloud database, which will implement the join query 
and return the join result to the QM. The QM then decrypts the join result and removes duplication 
if found. In the second case, the join condition contains only sensitive attributes that are not ranges 
of values. In this case, the QM creates a list Li [ ] for every partition of the attribute mentioned in 
the join condition, where Li [ ] will have the index of any record having its bit that mapped to 
partition node i is set to 1, before searching the BVM. Then the QM will rewrite the query to join 
all the tuples from both tables based on the indices of these lists. For example, there are two tables, 
A and B, both having the same attributes: ID, name, rank, department, salary. Now, assume that 
the query was to join them where A.rank = B.rank. Then let us say that the partition domains for 
rank attributes are manager, secretary, and employee. Now, the QM will create three lists for each 
table. The first list will contain the indices of the bit vectors in the corresponding BVM that have 
their bits mapped to the PD “manager” set to 1. The second list will hold the indices that have the 
bits mapped to the PD “secretary” set to 1, and the third list will contain the indices that have the 
bits mapped to the PD “employee” set to 1. In the next step, the QM rewrites the query to join the 
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tuples that have their indices in list Li [ ] from Table A with the tuples that have their indices in 
list Li [ ] from Table B. In the third step, the Cloud will execute the query and return the result to 
the QM, which will decrypt and remove any duplications before sending the result back to the 
user.  
In the third case, the join condition contains only sensitive columns that are ranges of values. 
This case is similar to the second case. However, in this case, the mapping between joined 
partitioning lists can be one too many. To illustrate this, consider Figure 3.4. Assume we want to 
join tables A and B by equality of salary. The salary column in Table A has three PDs that are 
[(10,000 to 20,000), (20,001 to 30,000), (30,001 to 40,000)], and the salary column has two PDs 
that are [(10,000 to 25,000), (25,001 to 40,000)]. We need to make sure that the QM rewrites the 
join query in a way that it maps the PDs from Table A to the corresponding PDs from Table B. To 
do that, the QM will create n lists for each table where n is the number of PDs in the table that has 
the fewest PDs in the joining column. So, in the above example, n =2 since Table B has the least 
PDs. In the first list L1[ ] in table A, the QM adds indices with bits that represent PD1, or  PD2 is 
1. In the second list L2[ ] of table A,  the QM adds indices with bits that represent PD2 or PD3 as 
1. The following figure, Figure 3.4, shows how the PDs are mapped. The QM rewrites the query 
before forwarding it to the Cloud. After getting the join result back from the Cloud for each tuple, 
the QM decrypts only the encrypted column’s value (only the encrypted columns involved in the 
join condition) and enforces the join condition. If the join condition is satisfied, the QM proceeds 
to decrypt all of the tuple’s values before moving to the next tuple. If the join condition is not met, 
the QM will not decrypt the entire tuple’s values and will move to the next tuple. We do so to 




last case is when the join condition involves two or more of the previous cases. In that case, the 
QM might rewrite the query. Algorithm 6 below shows how the QM performs the join. 
Algorithm 6: Join  
1: Input: the QM Parses user’s query to get tables’ names, attributes, and values. 
2: QM checks the PT of each table in the join and performs the following: 
3: Case 1 
4: If join column(s) is non-sensitive (not present in the PT) THEN 
5: Forward the query to the cloud server (CS) 
6: Define LinkedHashSet s 
7: For every fetched record i 
8: decrypt all values in i 
9: push i to s 
10: send s to the user 
11: Case 2 
12: If join column(s) is a sensitive AND not ranges, THEN 
13: For each PDj under the node that represent a SCi in PT of Table x 
14: Create a list Lxj [ ] 
15: For each BV in BVMx  
16: If the bit mapped to PDj is not 0 
17: Push the BV’ index to Lxj [ ] 
18: For each PDj under the node that represent a SCi in the PT of Table x1 
19: If the value v of PDj of SCi from table x1 equals to the v of PDj of SCi from 
Table x2  
20: PDj  of  x1 ⋈ PDj of x2 
21: Rewrite the query and send it to the cloud 
22: Define LinkedHashSet s 
 
Figure 3.4  An example of joining two tables by the equality of salary values 
Table B 
Partitions of salary  
10,000 to 25,000 
25,001 to 40,000 
 
Table A 
Partitions of salary  
10,000 to 20,000 
20,001 to 30,000 




23: For every fetched record i 
24: decrypt all values in i 
25: push i to s 
26: Send s to the user 
27: Case 3 
28: If join column(s) is a sensitive AND ranges, THEN 
29: For each PDj under the node that represent the SCi in PT of Table x 
30: Create a list Lxj [ ] 
31: For each BV in BVMx  
32: If the bit mapped to PDj is not 0 
33: Push the BV’ index to Lxj [ ] 
34: For each PDj under the node that represent the SCi in PT of Table x1 
35: If the PDj of SCi from table x1 contains at least one value v where v ∈ PDj from 
table x2 
36: PDj  of  x1 ⋈ PDj of x2 
37: Rewrite the query and send it to the cloud 
38: Define LinkedHashSet s 
39: For each fetched record i 
40: Decrypt only the join columns’ values  
41: If the join condition satisfied 
42: Decrypt the whole tuple’s values 
43: Push i to s 
44: Else  
45: Proceed to the next encrypted tuple  
46: Send s to the user 
47: Case 4 
48: The query involves two or more of the above cases. 
 
3.6.1.3.2 Union  
Union is one of the widely used operations in database systems in which tuples from two or more 
tables are merged. However, to execute a union operator, the number of attributes and datatype of 
both tables must be compatible. Even though the union operation removes the duplication from 
the union results, dealing with encrypted data complicates this step. To accomplish this, we could 
enable the cloud server to execute the union operator over encrypted tables and then send the result 
back to the QM. Doing so will move the union computation to the cloud server leaving only 
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decryption and duplication removal to the QM. The QM will decrypt each tuple in the union result 
set and add it into a LinkedHashSet as soon as it receives it from the Cloud. Note that both tables 
must be encrypted with the same secret key to execute the union algorithm. Algorithm 7 delineates 
the processes. 
Algorithm 7: union  
1: Forward the user’s query to the cloud server 
2: Define a vector v 
3: For each fetched record i in the union result set 
4: Decrypt i 
5: Add i to v 
6: v.distinct() 
7: Send v to the user. 
8: v.clear() 
 
3.6.1.3.3 Intersection  
Intersection is the process of finding the common subset out of two or more sets. However, 
executing intersection over encrypted databases is not easy without decrypting the data. If the 
tables to be intersected have a large number of records, the user is going to add a significant 
computational overhead by decrypting the whole set of the encrypted tuples from the intersected 
tables before executing the intersection operator. As a result, we cannot benefit from the cloud 
services because the computation is moved to the user’s side rather than on the cloud side. Some 
of the previously proposed systems in [2], [9], [10] can process queries over encrypted databases 
but will experience delays if the tables to be intersected have large numbers of tuples.  
In this model, our goal is to move the computation as much as possible to the cloud side 
while eliminating unnecessary decryption processes at the QM. Moreover, we want to execute the 
intersection operator partially in the cloud database server leaving only the elimination of 
duplication at the QM. In this way, we exploit the high computational speed provided by a cloud 
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database server to accelerate the query processing time. We explain the simulation of intersection 
as follows:  
• The user sends the query to the QM, which is going to parse it to remove the headers of 
tables and columns.  
• If the intersect operation involves k columns out of n columns, where n denotes the total 
number of columns in a table, the QM uses our join algorithm to join both tables by k -
columns and then rewrites the query. Otherwise, the QM chooses all SCs that are not in 
ranges to join the tables using our join algorithm before rewriting the query.   
• The QM sends the translated query to the cloud database server, which will execute the 
query and send back the join result to the QM. 
• Before returning the intersecting result to the user, the QM decrypts the encrypted join set 
and pushes it to a hash list to remove duplicates, if found.  
To illustrate the process, consider this example. Suppose we have two tables, A and B, and we 
want to carry out an intersection between them. Assume both tables have the same columns and 
the same PT as those shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
The translation process of the intersection query is accomplished as follows: 
 




1: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
2: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
3: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
4: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 5th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
5: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
6: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
7: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
8: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 6th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
9: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 1st, 6th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
10: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
11: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
12: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
13: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 5th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
14: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
15: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
16: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
17: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 




18: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 2nd, 6th, and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
19: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
20: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
21: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
22: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 5th, and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
23: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
24: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1. 
 
25: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1. 
 
26: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 
the 3rd, 6th , and 8th positions are set to 1. 
 
27: Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have 




To execute the difference in this prototype, the intersection is first enforced between the tables to 
find the common tuples. Second, the QM sends a query to retrieve all tuples except the join result 
set. Third, the QM decrypts the result and sends back the result.  
3.6.1.3.5 Duplication Removal  
Enforcing duplication removal over a query result (encrypted tuples) at the Cloud is impossible 
because we use a non-deterministic encryption algorithm (AES-CBC). Therefore, we leave the 
execution of this operator to be accomplished at the QM before sending back the user’s result. 
That means the QM will decrypt the encrypted tuples retrieved from the Cloud. If the query 
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contains the duplication elimination keyword “distinct,” the QM will define a LinkedHashSet data 
structure that does not allow duplicated elements in the set. It will then add each decrypted tuple 
to the set. Note that the translated query to be executed by the cloud server will not have the 
“distinct” keyword. Further, the keyword “distinct” usually appears in select queries, in which case 
the algorithm to eliminate duplication is the select algorithm, and we add three more steps to 
execute the distinct operator. See algorithm 8 below. 
Algorithm 8: duplication removal 
1: execute steps 1-9 of select algorithm 
2: if distinct keyword is present in the original query 
3: define LinkedHashSet s 
4: for each fetched tuple i 
5: decrypt values of i 
6: push i to s 
7: send s to the user. 
 
3.6.1.3.6 Aggregation and Sort  
To implement the aggregation and sort operators (max, min, and count) over encrypted tables in 
the Cloud, we consider two cases for sensitive columns, ranges, and non-range columns. In non-
range columns, we can process the query locally at the QM with no need to communicate with the 
Cloud. In such a case, we avoid the decryption computation that results from retrieving encrypted 
records from the Cloud. Consequently, we will achieve faster query processing. Specifically, the 
QM searches the BVM after looking up the corresponding PT using our search algorithm to obtain 
a list of all BVs’ indices that satisfy the query condition. Note that the QM might not need to do 
further computations such as decryption processes and will, therefore, send the query result back 
to the user. For the sake of clarity, consider Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, and Figure 3.2, suppose a user 
send the following query: 
select count(name) from students where department = ‘computer science’; 
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then, the query is processed as below: 
• The QM will search the PT and find that Dept is a non-range column (node’s color is gray). 
Then it will search the BVM (Figure 3.2) and push the index of any BV having the bit 
representing the PD “computer science” is not zero into a list L []. 
• The QM counts the number of the elements in L [] and returns the number to the user.  
     On the other hand, the query process is divided into two phases. The first phase is accomplished 
at the QM, while the second phase is handled in the Cloud. The QM executes the aggregation or 
sort operators over decrypted records after the QM processes the query to retrieve only candidate 
encrypted tuples that are related to the query. For example, the query 
Select count (‘name’) from student where the name =’Alice’; 
is processed as follows: 
• The QM looks up the PT and will find the name is a range column (node’s color is not 
gray). It will then search the corresponding BVM and add to the list L [] the indices of all 
BVs that have the bit assigned to the PD “A-F” is one. 
• The QM then looks for any encrypted record in which its index is present in L[] from the 
Cloud using this query syntax:  
select name from the student where index in (“elements of L [] separated by commas “). 
• The QM decrypts every fetched tuple’s name and increments the count value only if the 
decrypted name value equals ‘Alice.’ 
• The QM returns the value of the count variable to the user.  
The SUM and AVERAGE functions are processed similarly as a count, but we sum the decrypted 
numbers. If the operation is average, we divide the sum over the number of decrypted values that 
meets the query conditions. The sorting operator can be executed similarly to the aggregation 
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operator. However, we need to run the sort operator over decrypted data before sending the result 
back to the user. Algorithm 9 shows the process. 
Algorithm 9:  aggregate functions 
1: Do steps 1 to 6 of select algorithm. 
2: If all SCs are non-ranges 
3: If the operator is count  
4: Do steps 9 to 12 of select algorithm 
5: Let x = Count the number of Li [] 
6: Return x 
7: If the operator is max 
8:  Let m = the value of right most PD of the SC predecessor node in the PT 
9: Return m 
10: If the operator is min 
11:  Let n = the value of left most PD of the SC predecessor node in the PT 
12: Return n 
13: If all SCs are ranges 
14: If the operator is count  
15: Do steps 9 to 15 of select algorithm 
16: Define List Lk[] 
17: For each fetched record i 
18: Decrypt i 
19: If i meets the query condition 
20: Add it to Lk [] 
21: Return size of Lk [] to the user. 
22: If the operator is max 
23: For the right most PD of the SC 
24: Do steps 10 to 15 of select algorithm 
25: Define a variable x 
26: For each fetched record i 
27: Decrypt i 
28: If i > x  then 
29: x= i 
30: Return x to the user 
31: If the operator is min 
32: For the left most PD of the SC 
33: Do steps 10 to 15 of select algorithm 
34: Define a variable x 
35: For each fetched record i 
37 
 
36: Decrypt i 
37: If i < x  then 
38: x= i 
39: Return x to the user. 
 
3.6.1.3.7 Project 
In project queries, the QM does a column-based retrieval; it will select all tuples for specific 
column(s). Further, we do not need to perform a PT lookup in the project. However, we need to 
decrypt the whole set of retrieved tuples at the QM. We do not need to remove duplication of doing 




3.6.2 Bit Vectors as Column(n) (BVSAC) 
In this section, we discuss the model that stores bit verctors as an additional column in the main 
encrypted table. Some passages, figures, tables, and algorithms presented in this section  have been 
quoted verbatim from our published work in [60]. 
3.6.2.1  System Description 
We designed this model to execute different relational algebraic queries over encrypted data. In 
addition, we divided the computation into two sides: a client-side and cloud provider (CP) side, in 
which we shift the majority of the computation to the CP site by rewriting the queries into ways 
that enable the CP to execute them over encrypted data. The architecture of this model is shown 
in Figure 3.6. We developed an algorithm for each query category (e.g., select, join, union, 
intersection, etc.) to allow the CPs to execute such query categories over encrypted tuples. We 
used our encoding scheme, presented in section 3.5, to create BVs. However, instead of storing 
the BVs locally at the QM, we migrated them to the CP. On the CP side, the encrypted table 
 
Figure 3.6  BVSAC Architecture. 
39 
 
contains an additional column (reference column) to store a BV for each tuple. The data in the 
reference column is a BIT(n), where n is the number of bits. We are not concerned about the growth 
of the BVs because they are in bits stored in the Cloud. Because the maximum number of bits that 
can be stored in an attribute of type BIT is 64 bits, we need more than one attribute to store bits. 
Later, when it comes to translating the query, the QM can take the bits position and find the 
remainder of the modulo 64. So, when the bit position is 91, then 91 mod 64 =27, which implies 
that the new bit is located in the second bit’s attributes at position 27.  
Even though it is difficult for an adversary to infer the data distribution or the possible 
values of a column from the BVs, we encrypt the tables’ names and the headers’ sensitive columns 
using a deterministic encryption algorithm (AES) in which the ciphertexts for each plaintext are 
always identical. For example, the attribute “Students-Rank” contains a limited range of values 
like senior, grad, junior, etc. An attacker might be able to infer possible values, although they are 
randomly encrypted with AES-CBC (which always produces different ciphertexts for a plaintext). 
Having more than one ciphertext share the same prefix is not a concern because the adversary 
cannot get the plaintext unless he obtains the secrete key (sk). In this case, the sk is not passed to 
the cloud server.  
For example, we want to encrypt the table of graduate students, as shown in Table 3.2. Using the 
owner’s sk, the QM encrypts the table name and the names of sensitive columns using AES-DET. 
It then creates a new table at the cloud server. Using the PT presented in Figure 3.7 and our 
encoding algorithm described in section 3.5, the QM encodes the tuples into bit vectors (BVs).  
The outsourced encrypted table is similar to Table 3.3. Note that the encrypted table has an index 
column in which each index number is a part of each row’s initialization vector (iv)). To show 
how a query is processed using this system, assume a user submits the following query:  
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Table 3.2 Graduate students 
ID Name Rank Visa type Department 
110 Alice freshman F1 Computer science 
111 Sara senior J1 Computer engineering 
112 John junior None Information system 
113 Ryan Sophomore J2 Math 
 
“select name from Graduate_students where Department = “Computer Science” 
The QM handles the query as follows: 
1) The QM encrypts the name of the table and the sensitive columns’ headers using the sk of 
the table’s owner and obtains the ciphertexts as below: 
CTA =  EAES-DET (“Graduate students”, sk) 
CTB =  EAES-DET (“Name”, sk) 
2) The QM searches the PT to find the bits’ positions, then rewrites the query as:  
                    “select CTB from CTA where reference&32 > 0” 
3) The cloud server returns only the encrypted tuples that have the bit at position 32 (25) = 1.  
 
 
Figure 3.7  The PT of Table 3.2 
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Table 3.3 The encrypted graduate students table 
EAES-DET (“Graduate students”, sk), encrypted version of the outsourced graduate students table. 
Note that the headers of the columns are encrypted using AES-DET where ctn= EAES-DET (“Name”, 
sk), ctr= EAES- DET (“Rank”, sk), ctvt= EAES- DET (“Visa type”, sk), ctd= EAES- DET (“Department”, SK). 
Index ID ctn ctr ctvt ctd Reference 
01 110 *&^ *_^% */d ^%^H 10001000010000100000 
02 111 %^& /+$ &^/ &&%$ 00010100000100010000 
03 112 )(# %$/* +-*& )*#R 01000010000001001000 
04 113 $#! !@~K */f @$%* 00100001000010000010 
 
3.6.2.2 Condition Rewriting 
To allow the cloud server (CS) to search encrypted data, the QM must rewrite the query conditions 
in ways that allow the CS to execute the queries over encrypted tables. This translation process is 
a mandatory step before executing any query in any category. The QM rewrites the queries based 
on the stored (PT) of the table(s) involved in the query. As in [10], there are three conditions: 
1) A condition is containing a column and a value. 
2) A condition is containing only columns. 
3) Both 1 and 2.  
In both Type 1 and Type 2, we have five possible operators {>, <, =, ≥, ≤ } while in Type 3, we 
have three operators {V, ⌐, ꓥ}. In Type 1, the QM parses the query to get the table name, attribute 
headers, and values. After that, the QM finds the bit’s positions that represent the PDi under which 
value v falls. If the operation is “=,” the QM replaces values with its corresponding bit position. If 
the operator is “≥” or “>,” the QM locates the positions of all PDs that are less than v. Hence, the 
QM rewrites the query by replacing v with the positions separated by OR, removes ( “>” or “≥”), 
and adds “=” instead. For example, we have a table T, and it has a salary column attribute 
partitioned into three PDs as {(1000-5000), (5001-9000), and (9001-12000)}. Let us say that the 
partitions are mapped to the 32, 16, and 8, respectively. Assume that the user sends a query to fetch 
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any tuple in which “salary > 8000.” Then, the condition of the query after translation is “reference 
&16=1 OR reference &8=1.” We address the operations (“≤” or “<”) in a similar way as with “>” 
or” ≥.” However, we take the PDs ≤ v.  
In Type 2, for every table involved in the condition, the QM identifies the bits’ positions 
mapped to all PDs of the attributes A. If the operator is “ =,”  the QM rewrites the query by 
substituting the attributes’ headers with pairs of the PDs’ separated by the OR operation (pair1 ˅ 
pair2 ˅ pair3 …). For example, (PDi from attribute A, ꓥ PDi from attribute B, where PDi=PDj). 
To illustrate this, review Table 3.2 and assume that we have another table called (students info 
table), and both tables share the same PT as in Figure 3.8. Suppose the condition is “where 
GraduateStudents.name = students_info.name”. Then, let us say that: 
CTA=  EAES-DET (“graduate students”, sk)  
CTB =  EAES-DET (“students_info”, sk)  
Assuming that both tables were encrypted using the same sk, the translated query condition is as 
follows:  
“WHERE ((CTA.Reference&524288>0 AND CTB.Reference&262144>0) OR  
(CTA.Reference&262144>0 AND CTB.Reference&131072>0) OR 
(CTA.Reference&131072>0 AND CTB.Reference &65536>0)  OR 
(CTA.Reference&65536>0 AND CTB.Reference &32768>0))” 
We follow the same procedures if the columns are numeric, and the operators are in {>, <,  ≥,  
≤}. In Type 3, each condition can be one or more of the above two types separated by AND/ OR 





3.6.2.3 Basic Operations 
Insert statements, as in the previous model, enable this model to insert encrypted record(s). 
To perform the insertion, we follow the same steps in the BVM system. However, instead of 
appending the BV to the BVs matrix locally at the QM, we insert it as a value for the reference 
column. 
Select statements execution in this model is accomplished as follows:  
The QM gets the user’s query, rewrites it according to the tables’ PT, and sends the translated 
select query to the cloud server (note that the QM translates the clauses that involve only sensitive 
columns). Then, the cloud server executes the translated query and sends back the result (encrypted 
tuples for all candidate records). Now, the QM decrypts and applies the selection operation to filter 
unrelated data before returning the result to the user. We illustrated the process in the example in 
the previous sub-section. Algorithm 10 outlines the steps to be performed by the QM to execute 
the select statement. 
Algorithm 10: select 
1: Input < Table name, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns ci mentioned in the query are sensitive 
3:     Forward the query to CSP 
4:       Decrypt encrypted data 
      Send result back to the user 
5: If all column(s) ci mentioned in the query are sensitive 
6:     For each data item di / value v being searched for under column ci 
7: Find the bit’s position that mapped to the partition domain PD that di falls under 
in the table’s PT. 
8: Rewrite the query and substitute values by bits’ positions. 
9: Send the translated query to CSP to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs) 
10: Decrypt CTs then implement select again to filter out unrelated records. 




To execute update statements, we use the select algorithm that is presented in Algorithm 
10 to fetch candidate encrypted records from the Cloud. Then, if the new updated value(s) belong 
to a different partition domain, the QM finds the exact record(s) and sends an updated query to the 
Cloud to update the encrypted record(s) and the bits.  
In delete statements, the QM uses Algorithm 10 to obtain the encrypted records from the 
Cloud. It then identifies the exact record(s) after decrypting the candidate records. Immediately, a 
delete query is issued by the QM to the Cloud to delete the encrypted records. 
The process for the alter query is similar to the first model. We use the partitioning tree 
(PT) to determine whether or not a column is sensitive. If the column is sensitive, the QM will 
identify the node and its children nodes. In other words, the QM finds the node numbers that 
represent bits positions of the encrypted column. Then, the QM issues an alter query to delete the 
bit positions from the reference column and the encrypted table. The QM then removes the node 
of this column and its children nodes from the PT. If a sensitive column is added, the process is 
reversed. The QM adds a node to the second level and adds its partitions as children nodes in the 
third level. It will then add n bits where n equals the number of new children nodes added to the 
reference column.  
3.6.2.4 Relational Algebra Operators 
3.6.2.4.1 Join  
To enable the proposed model to support the join operator, we must consider different cases for 
the join condition: 1) the join condition involves only non-sensitive columns, 2) the join condition 
involves only sensitive columns that have limited distinct values, and 3) the join condition involves 
sensitive columns that may have too many distinct values. The first case is straightforward because 
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the QM is required only to forward the query to the cloud database server (CDBS). Then, it 
decrypts the result and removes the duplication. 
In the second case, the QM uses the data structure DSs of the tables in the join condition 
to match the PDs of the tables. For example, we have two tables, T1 and T2. In Table T1, each PDj 
under a sensitive column SCi is joined with each PDj under a sensitive column SCi in T2 if and 
only if the PDj from T1 equals the PDj from T2. Note that the QM does this only for columns that 
are involved in the join condition.  
The third case is based on the range of PDs. If PDi has at least one common element, the 
QM joins the PDs from both tables and ensures that each PDi of the SC from Table T1 is joined 
with each PDi of the SC from Table T2. For example, assume the salary PDs in Tables  T1 are [PD1 
(10,000–15,000), PD2 (15,001–20,000), PD3 (20,001–25,000), and PD4 (25,001–30,000)], and in 
T2 are [PD1 (10,000–20,000), and PD2 (20,001–30,000)]. The QM joins PD1 from Table T2 with 
PD1, PD2 from Table T1 because PD1 of Table T2 contains elements from both PD1 and PD2 of 
Table T1, and so on. The QM then rewrites the query and sends it to the Cloud. The Cloud returns 
the join result to the QM, which decrypts only the columns involved in the join condition and 
checks whether the plaintexts satisfy the join condition. The QM decrypts the whole tuple only if 
the two values satisfy the join condition. Otherwise, the QM skips to the next tuple. We do so to 
eliminate unnecessary decryption processes. The QM eliminates duplicates after decrypting the 
whole result. Algorithm 11 shows the steps of the join operation. 
Algorithm 11: join  
1: Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns mentioned in the join condition are sensitive 
3:       Forward the query to CDBS 
4:        Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication 
       Send result back to the user 
5: If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive 
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6: If the SCs have limited distinct values  
7: Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from table Tm with 
the equivalent PDi of a SCx from table Tn  
8:      If the SCs have range values  
9: Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from table Tm with 
each PDi of a SCx from table Tn if it has at least 1 common value. 
10: Rewrite the query and substitute columns’ names by bits’ positions separated by 
OR operation. 
11: Send the translated query to CDBS to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs) 
12: Decrypt CTs and remove duplication 
13: Send result back to the user 
 
3.6.2.4.2 Union 
To process union queries, we follow the same processes presented in the previous system for BVM.  
3.6.2.4.3 Intersection 
The intersection operation uses the same two conditions as the union operation. However, instead 
of retrieving all encrypted tuples of both tables, we extract only the tuples that are common to both 
tables. We must simulate the intersection operation because it is impossible to apply it over 
encrypted tuples. To do that, in the CDBS, we use the inner join between the two tables. The join 
condition is based on PDs that are not ranges because range-based PDs return more candidate 
tuples. The CDBS then executes a query to choose the tuples from Table A that exist in the join 
result. After that, the CDBS returns the joining result to the QM, which eliminates duplicates after 
the decryption process. For example, Table A and Table B have attributes (Name, Visa type, 
Rank). Then we perform the inner join operation in which the condition is visa type = visa type 
AND Rank= Rank). Note that, in the condition, we substitute the columns’ names with the 
positions of the corresponding bits to enable the CDBS to execute the operation. This substitution 
filters out too many uncommon tuples in the Cloud, resulting in fewer decryption operations by 
the QM. Algorithm 8 illustrates that processes. 
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Algorithm 12: intersection  
1: Input < Tables names> 
2: Find all common sensitive columns that are not ranges between the tables  
3: For each table Ti 
4: Find bits’ positions of PDs  
5: Initiates an inner join query where the joining condition is based on the equivalence 
of the bits obtained from step 4 for each table. 
6: Send the query to CDBS 
7: Decrypt the result of join. 
8: Implement distinct over decrypted data to Remove duplication 
9: Send result back to the user 
 
3.6.2.4.4 Difference 
To invoke the difference operator, we follow the same procedures as in the BVM system.  
3.6.2.4.5 Duplication Removal 
To remove the duplication, we follow the same steps as the BVM system.  
3.6.2.4.6 Aggregate and Sort 
In this operation, we have two cases. First, the condition clause is based on column(s) in which its 
partitions domain PD values are not ranges. In this case, the CDBS efficiently implements the 
aggregation operation over encrypted data and sends back the result to the QM, which needs only 
to decrypt the result and send it back to the user. Note that the QM may not implement the 
aggregation operator again over the decrypted data because the candidate tuples retrieved from the 
CDBS are the exact query result.  
For example, consider Table 3.2,  Table 3.3, and Figure 3.7.  A query select count(*) from 
GraduateStudents where department = “Computer science”;  is translated to “select count(*) from 
EAES-DET(“Graduate students”, SK) where reference &32 >0”. It returns only the number of tuples 
that satisfy the condition because the condition is based on the partition domain “computer 
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science” that is not a range of values. The second case is the condition clause, which is based on 
column(s) in which its partitions domains’ values are ranges. In addition to the operations in the 
first case, the QM implements the aggregation operator again over decrypted candidate tuples. The 
reason is that candidate tuples have tuples unrelated to the query because the PDs are ranges. In 
the normal operation, the whole calculation is done at the QM. However, we minimize the range 
of encrypted records retrieved from the CDBS by only those that satisfy the condition clause of 
the average query. Algorithm 13 illustrates these steps. 
 
To enforce sort operators over encrypted data, we can first make the cloud server filters 
out unrelated records according to the PDs of the PT. Then the QM decrypts the returned sorted 
result from the Cloud and executes the sort operator over them again. The sorting computation 
performed at the QM before returning the final result to the user and after retrieving candidate 
tuples is significantly small because the CDBS sends back only those candidate records that fall 
under a specific partition domain(s). However, the CDBS will return a group of records that are 
Algorithm 13: Aggregation operator 
1: Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) > 
2: If none of columns mentioned in the aggregation query are sensitive 
3:          Forward the query to CDBS 
4:               Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication 
              Send result back to the user 
5: If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive 
6: Reconstruct the query by substituting data items/ values by the bits’ positions that 
mapped to the PDs that contain data items.  
7:    Send the query to CDBS 
8: If the SCs in the aggregation query are not ranges 
9:        Decrypt the result  
10:        Send result back to the user 
11: If the SCs in the aggregation query are ranges 
12:        Decrypt the result  
13:        Execute aggregation operator again over the result 
14:        Send result back to the user 
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not sorted except by the partition domain. For example, to retrieve tuples that have an income 
ranging from 50k to 60k, the cloud server returns all encrypted records that have income within 
this range unsorted. Therefore, the QM sorts them after the decryption process.  
3.6.2.4.7 Project  




3.6.3 Bit Vectors as an Independent Table (BVSIT) 
In this section, we discuss the model that uses bit verctors as a separate table. Some passages, 
figures, tables, and algorithms presented in subsections (3.6.3.1 and 3.6.3.2) have been quoted 
verbatim from our published work in [61]. 
3.6.3.1 Model Description 
In this prototype, we store the bit vectors (BVs) in an independent table in the cloud server. We 
add an index column to both the encrypted table and the independent table (i.e., the bits table), in 
which the index of each record in the encrypted table equals the index of the corresponding record 
in the bits table. To ensure that the bits table does not leak any data from bits representations, we 
encrypt the indices in the bits table to ensure that an attacker cannot determine what record in the 
bits table is intended for the encrypted record x in the encrypted table. Furthermore, we perform 
record-based shuffling in the bits table so that the records will not have the same order as the main 
encrypted table. Figure 3.6 shows the architecture of the proposed model. 
For security in the BVSIT, data in all sensitive columns are encrypted with a symmetric 
encryption algorithm (AES-CBC). This version is a randomized encryption algorithm in which the 
plaintexts have different ciphertexts. By doing this, we enforce maximum security and make this 
model resistant to various attacks such as chosen plaintext attacks and inference attacks. In 
addition, having the bits table stored in the Cloud without index encryption could lead to data 
leakage and enable the attacker to identify which record in the bits table represents a specific 
encrypted record in the main encrypted table(i.e., record linkage attack). The attacker could do this 
by matching the indices in both tables. To avoid this scenario, we encrypt the index column in the 




ensures that the attacker cannot infer which record in the bits table represents the encrypted record 
x. 
3.6.3.2 Basic Operations 
Before explaining how to support basic SQL operations in this model, consider the employees’ 
table presented in Table 3.6. Given the PT (shown in Figure 3.10), the bits table is shown in Table 
3.4, and the encrypted table is shown in Table 3.5.  
In select statements, we use the PT to rewrite the select queries appropriately so that the 
cloud server can execute SQL queries over the encrypted data with no need to modify the 
functionality of the database system. Because the PT is stored locally in the QM, the QM will 
conduct a quick lookup to determine whether the attributes in the select conditions are sensitive. 
Then, the QM will issue two queries. The first query retrieves the encrypted indices of all candidate 
tuples for the  select query from  the bits table.  The second query retrieves the encrypted tuples  
 
Figure 3.9  BVSIT Architecture. 
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Table 3.4 Bits table of Table 3.5 
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
CT(3) 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CT(4) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
CT(1) 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
CT(2) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Table 3.5 Encrypted employees table 
 
Index ID Name SSN Rank Salary 
1 ^%# )@( $@^# @^#S FS^@ 
2 (#* ^#* )@H2 +_@ %@*& 
3 (#( (#& $@% @^#@ @%TW 
4 )^@ )^#H !@M *@^# +_)#FQ 
 
Table 3.6 The employees' table 
ID Name SSN Rank Salary 
01 Alice 12701 Secretary 30,000 
02 Ryan 25678 Admin 60,000 
03 Mark 46932 Secretary 29,000 
04 John 42213 Manager 55,000 
 
 
(whose indices were decrypted after being retrieved from the previous query) from the encrypted 
table. For clarity, consider Table 3.4, Table 3.5, and Figure 3.10 for the following query:  
select name from employees where rank = “manager” or salary = “60,000”. 
Then, the query is processed as follows:  
 
Figure 3.10 The Partitioning Tree (PT) of the employees table. 
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1) The QM uses the PT of the employee table to locate the nodes representing the partitions 
under which the values fall (i.e., “manager” and “60,000”). 
2) According to the PT, “manager” is mapped to the node of ID = 6, and “60,000” falls under 
the values represented by the node ID = 12.  
3) The query is translated to another query to select the index from the bits table, where “6” = 
1 or “12” =1; this enables the CSP to return any index that has a value of 1 in either column 
6 or column 12.  
4) The QM will retrieve the encrypted indices (CT (4) and CT (2)) and decrypt them to obtain 
the plain indices (2,4). 
5) A new query is issued to retrieve the encrypted tuples from the main encrypted table. The 
query is: 
select name from encrypted_employees where index in (2,4). 
6) The QM will decrypt the data and ensure that rank = “manager” and salary = ‘60,000’ before 
returning the result to the user.  
The same process is followed if the condition has either more or fewer clauses. As in step three, 
the operation “AND” and “OR” remain unchanged in the query condition. 
To make this model sufficiently flexible and practical for all types of users, insert is 
enabled to support insert queries. Before the encryption process begins, the QM uses Algorithm 1 
to encode the inserted record(s) to the bit vector(s). The insert query leads to the sending of two 
insert queries to the Cloud, one to insert the encrypted record into the encrypted table and the other 
to insert the bits in the bit vector into the independent bits table. To do the shuffling, the system 
will occasionally and automatically retrieve the entire bits table, re-encrypt the indices, and 
perform a column-based, then record-based, shuffling before outsourcing the table once again. The 
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reason to re-encrypt the indices is that if they are not re-encrypted, the cloud provider can easily 
find the recently inserted record(s).  
In update queries, the QM determines if the new value is intended for a sensitive column 
by conducting a lookup of the PT. The select rewriting method is used to accomplish this step so 
that only the candidate-encrypted tuples of the update query are retrieved. Following this, the QM 
finds the exact record(s) after the decryption process and issues two queries to update both tables 
in the Cloud (i.e., the encrypted table and the bits table). For example, we want to update Mark’s 
salary (the third record in Table I) to 50,000. The QM uses a select operation to retrieve Mark’s 
record and finds that the new salary falls under the node “12” that is mapped to column “12” in 
the bits table. The QM will then issue two queries to update the new salary (i.e., the ciphertext of 
the new salary value) in the encrypted table and update the value of column “10” to 0 and column 
“12” to 1. 
For the delete query, the QM uses the select method described earlier to retrieve the 
candidate-encrypted records from the Cloud, decrypt them, and then find the required record(s). 
The query is processed as follows: 1) The QM sends a select query to obtain the encrypted indices 
of the candidate records from the bits table that is outsourced to the Cloud. 2) The QM decrypts 
the encrypted indices and issues another query to retrieve the encrypted tuples from the main 
encrypted table; the query will be a select query based on the indices obtained from the first query. 
3) The QM will decrypt the encrypted tuples and filter the tuples that are unrelated to the query. 
4) The index of any record related to the delete query will be kept by the QM, which will then 
issue two deletion queries, one to delete the record from the encrypted table and the other to delete 
the corresponding record from the bits table. 
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The alter query is applied in the following process. When deleting a column, we first search 
the second level of the corresponding PT to determine whether the column is sensitive (this step 
occurs locally at the QM). In essence, the query is forwarded to the Cloud if the column is non-
sensitive. Otherwise, the QM finds the IDs of all children nodes (i.e., sub-nodes at level 3) of the 
node that represents the sensitive column. Then, the node and its children nodes are deleted. 
Following this, the QM issues a query to delete all columns that represent the deleted partitions 
from the bits table in the Cloud. It then sends another query to delete the encrypted column from 
the Cloud. Note that we do not focus on updating the IDs of the level-three nodes at the PT. We 
can keep their IDs, and we eliminate any unnecessary computations that could result from updating 
them. To add a column, we follow the same deleting procedure but in the opposite way. We add a 
node at the second level of the PT and then add sub-nodes that represent the partition domains of 
the column. The n columns are then added to the bits table at the Cloud where n = the number of 
sub-nodes recently added to level three of the PT. We also add a column to the encrypted table to 
store the encrypted data of the newly added column. 
3.6.3.3 Relational Algebra Operations 
3.6.3.3.1 Join  
As with the BVM system, implementing join over encrypted data without decrypting data or 
modifying the functionality of the DBMS is a difficult task, particularly in our case where we use 
a randomized encryption algorithm to encrypt sensitive data. However, to enable the cloud 
provider to execute join without decrypting the data, we developed a strategy to accomplish this 
while leaving most of the computation to the Cloud. In the following section, we explain how we 
process the join operator.  
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The QM gets the join query and parses it to obtain the name of the tables and the sensitive columns. 
Note that we have the same cases as the previous model. If the join condition involves only non-
sensitive columns, the query is simply forwarded to the Cloud without any modification. 
Otherwise, the QM must perform a quick search to the partitioning trees (PTs) of the tables 
involved in the join query to find which partitions of the joining columns from both tables can be 
joined. To accomplish that, the QM rewrites the join query in a way to enable the CP to join any 
partition pi of the SC from Table A with any partition pj of the SC from Table B if and only if the 
pi equals pj or has common elements with pj. We do not want to miss any record. However, we 
want to eliminate any unrelated records from both tables. After that, the QM rewrites the query 
accordingly to fetch the encrypted indices from the outsourced bits tables of the joined tables. The 
QM then issues n queries where n is the total number of partitions in the joining SCs from both 
tables. So, if the joining SC in Table A has three partitions and joining SC in Table B has five 
partitions, the QM issues eight queries to the Cloud to retrieve the encrypted indices from the 
corresponding bits tables. After that, the QM decrypts the encrypted indices retrieved by each 
query and adds them to lists. Based on the lists obtained from the previous step, the final join query 
is then formed to fetch the candidate encrypted tuples from the main encrypted tables and send it 
to the cloud server.  
For example, we want to joint two tables, A and B, by Visa Type. For simplicity, we assume 
the two tables have the same PT and that the partitions of the Visa Type attribute are (F1, F2, J1, 
J2). In the bits table of Table A, named BOA (bits of A), the columns that represent Visa Type 
partitions are 5, 6, 7, and 8. In the bits table of Table B (named BOB), the columns are 2, 3, 4, and 
5. To execute the join query, the following queries are sent to the Cloud to retrieve the encrypted 




  Select indx AS A from BOA where ‘5’ =1;   Select indx AS B from BOB where ‘2’ =1.  
Select indx AS C from BOA where ‘6’ =1; Select indx AS D from BOB where ‘3’ =1. 
Select indx AS E from BOA where ‘7’ =1; Select indx AS F from BOB where ‘4’ =1. 
Select indx AS C from BOA where ‘8’ =1; Select indx AS D from BOB where ‘5’ =1. 
Note that we avoid the joining query (e.g., select BOA.indx AS A, BOB.indx AS B from BOA, 
and BOB where BOA.5 = 1 & BOB.2= 1) because it will slow the process. Our goal is to speed 
up the query processing time. However, to minimize the impact of the communication delay, we 
can send all the queries together as one string (i.e., as one prepared statement) to the Cloud. 
Therefore, the best way to achieve our goal (fast query processing) is by using the queries 
presented above. After completing this step, the QM defines eight lists, each of which contains the 
decrypted indices from a specific query (i.e., list 1 will have the decrypted indices retrieved from 






After the join is completed in the Cloud, the QM decrypts the result (only decrypting the joining 
columns and enforcing the condition, if satisfied; then proceeding to decrypt the remaining fields, 
otherwise skipping to the next tuple). The QM then removes any duplication before sending the 
result back to the user (using the same process followed in the previous two models). 
 
SELECT A.Name, B.name from (A inner join B on (A.indx in (elements of list 1) and 
B.indx in (element of list 2) OR A.indx in (elements of list 3) and B.indx in (element of list 
4) OR A.indx in (elements of list 5) and B.indx in (element of list 6) OR A.indx in (elements 




3.6.3.3.2 Union  
To implement the union operation between two or more tables, we need to fetch all encrypted 
tuples from all the unionid encrypted tables, then decrypt them and apply the distinct operator to 
remove the duplication. Note that we assume both tables were encrypted using the same secret key 
(sk). We follow the same processes as in the previous model (BVM) using an algorithm similar to 
that in the BVM model. 
3.6.3.3.3 Intersection 
The intersection operation is similar to the intersection operation in the BVM model. However, we 
intersect the bits tables before proceeding to intersect the encrypted tables in the Cloud. We use 
the join operation to simulate the intersection process and filter out uncommon tuples from the 
tables involved in the intersection operation. We follow the same procedures used for the 
intersection operation, as in the previous model.  
3.6.3.3.4 Duplication Elimination, Aggregation Functions, and Project 




4 Experiments and Evaluation 
In the previous chapter, we explained in detail the proposed models, and for each model, we 
presented the developed algorithms to execute different relational algebra operators. As stated 
earlier, this dissertation aims to implement, evaluate, and compare the performance of the proposed 
prototypes for different types of statements using various metrics (e.g., the execution delay of 
queries, space requirements at both the QM and the cloud server, and the percentage of the 
computation overhead at the QM versus at the cloud server).  
Furthermore, we compare our proposed prototypes to three systems: CryptDB [2], the one 
block-based technique (OBT; i.e., each row is encrypted as one block) [10], and the column-based 
fragmentation technique (CBF; i.e., each sensitive column is migrated to a cloud; read [9] for more 
details). In the discussion subsection, we make a comprehensive comparison between the proposed 
systems and the competing systems used in the evaluation. In addition, we recommend which 
model is suitable for single users and which model is ideal for multi-user systems after 
investigating the results of all the models.  
4.1 Experimental Setup  
We used a PC with 6GB of RAM, 1TB HDD, and a Core i5 processor with 2.8 GHz to conduct all 
the experiments for all the systems (BVM, BVSAC, BVSIT, OBT, CBF, and CryptDB). To 
implement the functions of the QM in the proposed models, we used Java to simulate each task as 
a java class or method. MySQL server was used on the user’s machine and we used Java Database 
Connectivity (JDBC) as a connector from Java to the MySQL engine. All the experiments were 
performed on the local machine; therefore, the communication delay variable was removed from 
all the reported delays.  
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We implemented the OBT and CBF because their implementations are not available online 
unlike CryptDB, which is available for public use on GitHub [62]. While implementing the CBF, 
we adopted the implementation in [63] to encrypt numerical values in a way that preserves the 
order (OPE) and in [64] to support the additive homomorphic property. In our models, we used 
the randomized version of the AES-CBC to encrypt sensitive data. In our systems, each tuple’s 
data are transmitted to the encryptor class as soon as the encoding step has been accomplished. 
The encryptor and decryptor classes call numerous cryptographic packages, including the 
“javax.crypto” package offering the classes and interfaces for crypto tasks; more information can 
be found in [65], and the table owner’s secret key (SK) and the pre-generated initialization vectors 
(IVs) can be used to encrypt or decrypt each tuple (each tuple needs a unique IV as explained in 
Chapter 3). The SK is 256 bits, and each IV is 128 bits (the IV size equals the block size in the 
AES). To store the bit vectors (BVs), we stored them locally at the QM in the first model, and we 
wrote them in a text file for future use (in the future, the QM just reads the BVs set from the file.txt 
and loads them to the data structure). In the other two models, we migrated the set of BVs to the 
cloud. 
4.2 Datasets and Partitioning Tree 
We randomly generated four tables. We defined a list of values for each attribute and let a java 
program constructs tuples by randomly picking values from the lists. The sizes of the tables (i.e., 
the number of records) were 10k, 20k, 50k, and 100k records. We had 24 attributes in total for all 
tables, and we considered all of them, except ID attributes, as sensitive attributes. In our study, 
although we could use the proposed models with small tables, we focused on the large tables since 
it is easier to test the penalties introduced by each scheme. Table 4.1 presents the structure of the 
main tables. For each table, we created a table in the cloud according to the created algorithm for 
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each model. We built a partitioning tree (PT) for all the tables based on Table 4.2. We generated 
the tables so that they were fairly distributed to the PT. For example, for the attribute (Name), not 
all the records were mapped to the first partition (node #1) under the name predecessor; instead, 
approximately 33% of the records were mapped to the first node, 33% assigned to the second node, 
and 34% assigned to the third node. We considered the same technique for the rest of the attribute 
partitions. 
 
Table 4.1 The structure of the original (plain) students' table 
Name of the Attribute Datatype Storage Required (bytes) 
ID int 4 
Name varchar 20 
SSN int 4 
Visa_Type varchar 6 
Salary int 4 
Department varchar 20 
 
 




ID No 0 
Name Yes 3 
SSN Yes 2 
Visa_Type Yes 4 
Salary Yes 5 
Department Yes 6 
Total number of partitions 20 
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4.3 Evaluation  
The evaluation consisted of the following:  
1) Testing and evaluating basic database operations (create, select, insert, update, and delete 
statements) execution cost  
2) Testing and evaluating aggregation operations (sum, average, count, max, and min) 
execution cost  
3) Testing and evaluating joining and setting operations (join, union, and intersection) 
execution cost 
4) Identifying space requirements for each system 
For each part, we considered different factors that play a role in the efficiency, such as the 
number of clauses in the query conditions, what the logic operation (AND/OR) is in the condition, 
and what encrypted attributes to retrieve for the tuples. In the discussion, we explore the factors 
that make the proposed models more efficient and what makes them inefficient. In addition, we 
discuss the impact of the PT size on the efficiency of the proposed models.  
4.3.1 Execution Delay Comparison  
4.3.1.1 Original Database Encryption and Insert Statements 
 In the proposed models, the original database encryption step involves parsing records, generating 
indices, building BVs, encrypting sensitive data, and inserting the encrypted data into the 
encrypted table in the cloud server. In Table 4.3, we compare the time taken by each system to 
encrypt each table. As seen in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1, the BVSAC experienced the least 
encryption and insertion delays among all systems because the QM does not need to store nor 
manage the BVs locally at the QM as in the BVM, which is why we see that the delay in the BVM 
is higher than the BVSAC. The second fastest model is the OBT, which encrypts every tuple as 
one block and adds M columns, where M is the number of sensitive columns, to store the integer 
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values of the identifiers. On the other hand, the CBF experienced the highest delay since the 
encryption process required N insertion (N = number of columns + 1) into N different tables in 
different cloud servers. The second slowest model is CryptDB in both the creation and insertion 
processes due to heavy computation results from the onion layer encryption. In summary, the 
proposed models are faster than the CryptDB and CBF models in both the creation and insertion 
processes.  
 
Table 4.3 The delay of the original database encryption comparison among all systems in 
minutes 
N.R BVM BVSAC BVSIT CryptDB CBF  OBT 
10k 12 11 25 44 55 13 
20k 26 23 48 66 112 24 
50k 65 54 115 158 291 55 
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4.3.1.2 Basic Statements 
In this section, we examine the delay in executing different basic statements (select, update, and 
delete) for all systems. Furthermore, we focus more on the select statements because they are the 
main operations in most database applications. In addition, most state-of-the-art research focuses 
on select for the same reason.  
4.3.1.2.1 Experiment 1  
In this experiment, we calculated the average percentage of fetched encrypted tuples from the 
encrypted tables for the proposed models. We also studied how the number of clauses in the query 
condition can contribute to narrowing the range of the fetched set. Figure 4.2 illustrates how our 
models dramatically drop the average retrieved encrypted candidate records for select statements 
to about 31% when only one clause is present in the query condition, while all the models fetched 
the least percentage when the condition clause had three clauses. On the other hand, without using 
any of the proposed prototypes to manage the randomized encrypted database (i.e., no indexing), 
we must retrieve the entire outsourced encrypted table.    
 
 












O n e  C l a u s e T w o  C l a u s e s T h r e e  C l a u s e s
Our approaches No indexing
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4.3.1.2.2 Experiment 2 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we aimed to reduce the crypto computation at the QM when possible 
to avoid computation overhead, which speeds up the query execution time. To accomplish this, we 
only decrypted the column values that were present in the query condition before proceeding to 
decrypt the encrypted values of the whole record. For the sake of clarity, we have, for example, 
the following select statement: 
select * from students WHERE name = ’Alice’ 
Using any of our proposed models, as depicted in Figure 4.3, we only fetch less than 35% of the 
entire set of the outsourced encrypted records. This depends on how the name column was 
partitioned beforehand; in our case, we had three partitions, and the more partitions that are 
defined, the lower percentage we obtain and vice versa. However, we do not immediately decrypt 
all the encrypted data of the fetched set. Instead, we decrypt only the name values to determine if 
the name is equal to “Alice” (i.e., we start by decrypting the column mentioned in the query 
condition). If the name equals “Alice,” then we decrypt the entire record; otherwise, we skip to the 
next one and so on. In Figure 4.3, we can see that from the whole fetched encrypted set, the average 
of the entirely decrypted rows was less than 24% of the fetched rows. Accordingly, our models are 
efficient since we are not only narrowing the range of retrieved outsourced data, but we are also 




Figure 4.3  Average percent of entirely decrypted tuples 
 
4.3.1.2.3 Experiment 3 
4.3.1.2.3.1 Select (*) Latency 
In this study, we focused on select statements since they are the widely used statements in the 
database systems. As explained in the previous chapter, the select statement is also part of the most 
proposed relational algebra algorithms (e.g., delete and update). Therefore, we deeply examined, 
tested, and evaluated the select statements with a different number of clauses and both cases of 
select single column values, such as, select name and select all (i.e., select *). Furthermore, as a 
part of this experiment, we compared the performance of the proposed models against the 
CryptDB, OBT, and CBF systems.   
Table 4.4 presents the total runtime for all systems when executing select statements to 
retrieve single column values. The runtime we measured was the time from query parsing until the 
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final query result was formed in milliseconds (ms). In the first case, we measured the average 
runtime when the condition clause of the queries features only one clause. The delay is the average 
delay of executing a select statement on each sensitive column. Furthermore, we tested select * 
statements when the condition had two and three clauses. Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6 
present the total execution time of select * statements for each model. As seen in the figures, the 
BVSAC averaged the shortest runtime of all the proposed models for all cases (i.e., single clause 
and multiple clauses) when the database sizes were 50k records or more. This result means that 
the BVSAC performs better, in term of execution time, with larger databases and has a higher 
start-up time than the other proposed models, which is why it is slower than some other systems 
for processing databases with 20k and 10k. Another factor that speeds up query processing is that 
we benefit from the bitwise operations, provided by MySQL, in the cloud because we store the 
bits as an independent column along with each encrypted record. Furthermore, we eliminated the 
manipulation of the indices at the QM in contrast to the BVM and BVSIT. For smaller databases 
(10k or less), the BVSIT experienced the fastest execution time of the proposed systems because 
the bitwise operations were performed in a column-based manner, allowing for rapid searching 
over the bits table; however, when databases grew, the performance of the BVSIT downgraded as 
the amount of the decrypted indices at the QM grew (i.e., the indices fetched from the bit table). 
The BVM model is the second fastest for databases with more than 50k rows, and the main factor 
that affects the performance of the BVM is the time for loading the BVs from the hard drive to the 
main memory and then searching them. Forming the final lists of the candidate record indices is 
another factor that affects the delay in this model.   
In terms of comparing the proposed prototypes with the other approaches, as seen in Table 
4.4, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6, the proposed models were faster than all the competing 
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systems except for the OBT for select statements with two or three clauses. The OBT experienced 
the least delay since the amount of decrypted data was less than in our approaches (all values are 
stored as one block leading to fewer bytes to decrypt for each row). Cell-based encryption produces 
longer ciphertexts (i.e., the blocks less than 16 bytes will be padded) and then higher decryption 
overhead. However, when the select query is not to select all (select *), our models perform better 
than the OBT because we eliminate decrypting whole rows in our models, whereas the OBT does 
not. When the query condition involved a single clause, the CBF system experienced delays 
comparable to our systems, but when the number of clauses in the select statements was two or 
three, its delay was almost double that of our system’s delays since two or three tables are searched 
to form the final select query (the query that retrieves the records from the main encrypted table in 
the master cloud). Finally, the CryptDB incurs the highest delay among the systems as a result of 
the decryption of the onion layers overhead. The delay also increases when the statement condition 
has two or three clauses because more onion layers are required to be slipped off in different 
columns. 
Table 4.4 Delays in milliseconds of executing (select *). 










(a) Average total processing time for all models, including CryptDB. 
 
 
(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
 
Figure 4.4 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models 
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(a) Average total processing time for all models, including CryptDB. 
 
 
(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
Figure 4.5 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models 
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
 Figure 4.6 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models 
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4.3.1.2.3.2 Select (col) Latency 
Table 4.5 presents the total query processing time of implementing select statements with one, 
two, and three clauses in the WHERE condition to retrieve a single column’s values instead of 
select *. To make a simpler comparison, in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, and Figure 4.9, we plotted the 
numbers from Table 4.5. Examining the figures reveals that the performance of the proposed 
models increased in the same order as implementing select *. However, our models tend to be 
slower than the OBT for executing select * over different database sizes, but with single-column 
selection, our models except the BVSIT beat the OBT when executed over different dataset sizes. 
The BVSIT performs better than the OBT for the database of 20k or fewer records but not for more 
extensive databases (i.e., 50k and 100k records) because the number of decrypted indices fetched 
from the bits table grows, which adds more computation overhead to the QM.  
Table 4.5 Delays in milliseconds of executing (select single column). 















(a) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
Figure 4.7 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve a single column’s 
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
Figure 4.8 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve only one 
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB. 
Figure 4.9 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve only one 
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4.3.1.2.3.3 Throughput  
Throughput is defined as the amount of data transferred at a given time. By measuring the 
throughput, we can tell which system is more responsive to user’s queries when the requested data 
are increased since the end user is the one who will be affected by the system slowdown. To 
measure the throughput, we executed a set of queries to retrieve % 25 then %50 of the records 
from a table holding 100,000 records. Then, we measure the amount of plain data (records’ data 
after decryption) and divide it by the time taken by each system to deliver the required data to the 
user [66].  
Throughput =  
∑ unencrypted record′s size (in bytes)
n
k=0
Total time taken to deliver the data (MS)
 , where n= the total number of required 
records. 
As seen in Table 4.6, the proposed systems achieved a higher throughput when compared 
with CryptDB and CBF systems. Further, BVSAC achieved a higher throughput among the 
proposed systems in this research which makes it the best choice for end users who seek a faster 
responsive system. OBT has the highest throughput and that is because it requires the least bytes 
requirements among all systems to encrypt data.  
In Figure 4.10, we show the percent of the throughput for each system and we compare the 
systems with the throughput of MySQL when dealing with unencrypted data. To calculate the 
percent, we multiply the system throughput by 100 and divide it by the unencrypted throughput.  
 
Throughput percent = 
System′s throughput ∗ 100
Unencrypted throughput
 
By examining Figure 4.10, we can say that our systems achieved a reasonable throughput 
percent and as the amount of required data increased (up to 50% of the rows), the throughput 




Table 4.6 The amount of plain data in kB that each system can deliver to the user per 
second.  
 kilobytes per second (kB/s) 
BVM BVSAC BVSIT OBT CBF CryptDB MySql 
Requested rows = 25% 794 1083 778 1440 727 66 4720 






Figure 4.10 The percent of throughput of all systems compared with the throughput of 
MySQL when requesting unencrypted data. Note, the requested data are fetched by a select 
query from a table with 100,000 records.  
 
4.3.1.2.4 Experiment 4: Update and Delete Statements 
Figure 4.11 depicts the average time cost taken by each system to execute update statements. In 
this experiment, we executed update statements with only one predicate. As seen in Figure 4.11, 
the update time cost is high in all systems and is the result of updating an encrypted field in the 


































Requsted rows = 25% Requsted rows = 50% Unencrypted
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which means selecting the required data and then issuing 100 insert statements in the first case, 
200 insert statements in the second, and so on. The BVSAC and OBT systems have a close update 
delay, 6,812 and 7,130 ms, respectively. However, in the OBT, the update process is risky when 
two or more substrings in the decrypted block match the updated value (i.e., any substring from 
the updated record that matches the new substring will be updated to the new substring). Thus, 
update in the OBT is not recommended. By zooming to the delays of the proposed models, the 
BVSIT is the slowest system because the update must be done in both the main encrypted table 
and the bits table, and it is the second slowest model. In addition, the BVM experienced a slightly 
higher delay than the BVSAC but still performed faster than the CBF, which is the third slowest 
model in this comparison. In CryptDB, the update cost is the highest of the compared systems. In 
summary, the BVSAC is the most efficient model for update statements.  
Figure 4.12 demonstrates the time taken by each model to delete different numbers of 
records (100, 200, 500, and 1,000 tuples) when the delete condition has only one clause. The delete 
process selects the required rows and then deletes them. The delete is efficient in all the proposed 
models because the delete is performed after executing the select operation to retrieve the needed 
tuples. Instead of sending a single query to delete each record, we maintain the index of the record 
and then issue one query at the end to delete any record of its index in the delete query, that is, 
delete from TABLE_NAME where index in ( ).  On the other hand, CryptDB is the slowest system 








Figure 4.11  Comparison of the average delay of update statements for all models to 
update a number of existing tuples (100, 200, 500, and 1,000 tuples). 
 
 
Figure 4.12   Comparison of the average delay of delete statements for all models to 
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4.3.1.1 Aggregation Functions 
4.3.1.1.1 Experiment 5  
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 list the average execution times of the aggregation operators’ (sum, 
average, count, max, and min) queries for the proposed prototypes along with the competing 
systems. All the aggregate queries executed in this comparison have one predicate (i.e., we did not 
execute the aggregate functions on the entire column’s values), and the average number of records 
that meet the aggregate condition in all the queries is approximately 6%. The cost resulted from 
the aggregate functions relying on the cost of select statements in the proposed models because 
first, the query is rewritten to fetch the required rows (e.g., “select rows where department = 
Business”), then while decrypting the result, the QM enforces the aggregate function if the query 
condition is met (refer to the aggregate algorithms of the proposed systems in Chapter 3). In the 
OBT system, the procedures we followed in the proposed systems were followed, but the whole 
encrypted rows were fetched, which results in heavier computation overhead at the QM. In the 
CBF and CryptDB, the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the numerical field to support the 
addition operation over the encrypted values is homomorphic encryption (i.e., the Paillier 
algorithm). The Paillier algorithm relies on multiplying the modular to produce the encrypted sum, 
which requires heavier computation than the proposed models. In the implementation of the CBF, 
we adopted the Paillier algorithm in [64] to encrypt the extended salary column; however, to 
execute the aggregate function, the indices of the rows in column A that meet the aggregate 
condition must first be retrieved from the corresponding table at cloud x that maintains the 
extended column A. Then, the aggregate query was rewritten to apply the aggregate function over 
the encrypted values of the records that their indices are in the query predicate. From both tables 
(Table 4.7 and Table 4.8), we can conclude that the proposed models achieved a faster execution 
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delay than the others for smaller databases, but for larger databases, the BVSAC is the winner, 
while the BVSIT starts to experience heavier computations, as stated in the previous experiment. 
CryptDB is the slowest model in all database sizes due to the intensive decryption operations.  
Table 4.7 Delay comparison in milliseconds of executing SUM, AVERAGE, AND COUNT 




Table 4.8 Delay comparison in milliseconds of executing MAX and MIN functions. (only 
one predicate in the queries) 
 
Average delay of MAX and MIN 
BVM BVSAC BVSIT OBT CBF CryptDB 
10k 112 123 109 208 147 878 
20k 201 217 237 289 208 1714 
50k 447 311 480 532 363 10762 
100k 741 468 858 815 647 20185 
 
4.3.1.2 Join, Union, and Intersection  
4.3.1.2.1 Experiment 6 
In this study, we compared the delay of the proposed prototypes for join and union queries. In join 
queries, we did not include the competing systems in this experiment because the join has not been 
implemented in CryptDB (as the author stated in [62]) and the CBF. Therefore, we excluded all 
the competing systems from this experiment, and we performed the experiment on tables with the 
specifications displayed in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9 Specifications of the joined tables 
Table size (number 
of rows) 
Number of rows matching 





We joined two tables by the equality of the encrypted ID, and their structures are in Table 
4.11 and Table 4.10 below. The ID column in both tables is partitioned into 10 partitions based on 
the last digit in the ID as (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). Figure 4.13 demonstrates that the delay of 
the BVSAC is the highest, followed by the BVSIT, and the BVM has the least delay. The high 
delays in the join queries in all the proposed models are due to the nature of the join calculation 
and the amount of the decrypted data. Then, after enforcing the join condition (at the QM), the 
decrypted tuples were pushed into a LinkedHashSet to remove the duplication. In conclusion, 
although we experienced high join delays, we executed the join statements using the proposed 
systems over databases that were encrypted with a randomized encryption algorithm, such as AES-
CBC.  
Figure 4.14 demonstrates the average total time of processing the union queries of all the 
proposed systems. In all the proposed prototypes, the QM intercepts the union query and forwards 
it to the server without modification. Therefore, the cost presented in Figure 4.14 is the average 
delay of processing the union statements taken by all the models (we took the average execution 
time of all the systems since the delay of the union queries is roughly close for all the models). 
The delay we measured is from the time the QM intercepts the query until the final query result is 
formed. To remove the duplications, we pushed the decrypted tuples from both tables to a 
LinkedHashSet, which ensures no duplicated records exist. As seen in Figure 4.14, our models 
experienced a linear delay growth as the sizes of the tables increased. 
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In Figure 4.15, we show the latency, in milliseconds, of the intersection operator when 
executed on different tables with a different number of records.  To perform this experiment, we 
reduced the tables’ sizes because we experienced execution failures due to the lake of memory. 
Moreover, the leading cause to get this kind of error is the massive join computations that result 
from implementing the intersection operator. Note that the intersection queries were to intersecting 
tables based on all columns (i.e., not a partial intersection).  As seen in Figure 4.15, The BVM 
system is the most efficient in performing the interaction, while the BVSAC is the least efficient 
in terms of latency. The factors that cause the variation in the delay are the same factors that affect 
delays in join queries.  
Table 4.11 The structure of TA students table. 





ID int Yes 
Name varchar Yes 
SSN int Yes 
Visa_Type varchar Yes 
Salary int Yes 
Department varchar Yes 
 
Table 4.10 The structure of original international students 
table 





ID int Yes 
Name varchar Yes 
Address int Yes 



































Figure 4.15 Intersection latency comparison among the proposed systems 
 
4.3.1.3 Query Rewriting at the QM 
4.3.1.3.1 Experiment 7 
Figure 4.16 depicts the average time taken by each model to rewrite a query. The processes 
required to rewrite a query are presented in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12 Query rewriting stages 
 Query parsing PT search 
BVs store and 
search (at QM) 
Indices 
decryption 
BVM ✔ ✔ ✔ x 
BVSAC ✔ ✔ x x 









B V M B V S A C B V S I T
500x1K (common rows =2) 1Kx5K (common rows =30)
5Kx10K (common rows =280)
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To calculate the average, we executed a set of queries for different cases of select statements with 
one, two, and three clauses. We focused on the select statements because they are part of the update 
and delete statements, so examining the select statement is enough to measure the cost of 
translating queries in each model; we excluded the crypto operations from this percentage.  
In Figure 4.16, the pie chart represents the total average delay taken by all the proposed 
prototypes in translating a query. According to this chart, the BVM has the largest portion of delay 
(about 52%), followed by BVSIT (about 38%), leaving only 10 % of the total cost to the BVSAC. 
The BVM presents the highest percentage because of the BV preparation and processing. 
Afterward, the QM needs to prepare a list containing the indices of the candidate records to be 
fetched from the cloud. This step is mandatory before the translation process. In the BVSIT, 
although the QM does not maintain the BVs, which we migrated to the cloud, the main reason for 
the delay is the decryption processes of the fetched BV indices. Another factor contributing to this 
delay is that the QM must communicate twice with the MySQL engine to process a query. In the 















4.3.1.4 Cloud Server Computation versus QM Computation 
Figure 4.17 illustrates the average percentage of the computation time at the QM compared to the 
server when a query is executed by the proposed prototypes and by the other systems. The figure 
demonstrates that the CryptDB has succeeded in moving over 90% of the query processing 
computation delay to the server, leaving less than 10% of the computation delay to the QM (the 
QM is equivalent to the proxy in both the CryptDB and CBF). Despite this, the penalty is the 
higher query processing delay, as demonstrated in the previous experiments.  
  In our proposed prototypes, we can see that BVM has most of the computation overhead 
at the QM because in addition to the crypto operation, the BVs are processed locally at the QM. 
About 60% of the computation is at the QM in the BVSIT due to decrypting the BVs’ encrypted 
indices after fetching them from the server. The OBT has about 53% of the computation at the QM 
because the QM is entirely decrypting the fetched records, even for queries not based on select * 
statements.  
 On the other hand, the BVSAC and CBF experienced a close percentage of overhead at the 
QM and cloud (about 50% of the computation moved to the server) because in the BVSAC, the 
BVs are searched at the server, and we avoid processing them at the QM, as explained earlier. 
Furthermore, in the CBF, the arrangements of different sets of indices and the rewriting of the 
query after performing conjunctive operations between the set of indices are the leading causes of 





Figure 4.17  The percentage of the computation at the QM versus at the cloud server 
 
4.3.2 Space Requirement  
In this section, we evaluate each system in terms of the space requirement at both the cloud server 
and the QM as, for the proposed systems, a system could require not only space to store the 
encrypted table at the server but also space to maintain the BVs. In Table 4.13, for each proposed 
model (BVM, BVSAC, and BVSIT), we present the total space required for each record at the 
server in bytes. The index column is an integer that required 4 bytes, while the rest of the columns 
(the columns that will be encrypted) required 33 bytes (32 bytes since the secret key is 32 bytes + 
1 byte to record the datatype length [67]. In addition, we present the space required to store the 
BVs on the server for each model. In the same table, we present the storage requirement per row 
for the OBT, CBF, and CryptDB. For the OBT scheme, all the values are stored as one block in 
one column; however, a column (datatype of int) is still required for the identifier of each sensitive 
column in the main table. In total, there are six columns in the plain table, which require six 
















server) needs 257 bytes for Paillier ciphertexts plus 9 bytes for OPE ciphertexts plus 17 bytes for 
the randomized ciphertext at the main encrypted table that will be at the master server. For string 
columns, only deterministic ciphertexts are migrated to the extended columns and randomized 
ciphertexts at the main encrypted table at the master cloud. For the index column, we need 28 bytes 
(4 bytes for each extended table, which is six + the main table). On the other side, in CryptDB, 
each numerical column is extended to three columns (iv [17 bytes], Onion Ord [17 bytes], and 
Onion Add [257 bytes]), while the string column is extended to two columns (iv [17 bytes] and 
Onion Eq [17 ~ 33 bytes]).  
As seen in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.18, the OBT has the lowest storage requirement at the 
server side, followed by the BVM then the BVSAC. The BVSIT requires a higher space 
requirement than the BVSAC since we store the BVs as an independent table rather than a column 
in the same encrypted table, as in the BVSAC. The CBF needs about 1,046 bytes for each record, 
which is the highest space requirement among the systems. CryptDB scores the second-highest 
space requirements, about 1,023 bytes/record.  
Table 4.14 indicates the space requirements to store the BVs of the students’ table (Table 
4.1) at the QM for different sizes. We can conclude that the BVM requires 25,000 bytes to store 
the BVs of the table that holds 10,000 records, while other systems require no hard drive space to 
store any data to process a query. According to this, the space overhead is high in the BVM for 
executing a query because the whole set of the BVs is loaded from the hard drive into the data 





Table 4.13 Storage requirement per record at the server (cloud) of the encrypted student 
table (Table 4.1) in all the systems 
Name of the 
Attribute 





OBT CBF CryptDB 





ID varbinary 17 17 17 284 291  
Name varbinary 33 33 33 66 50 
SSN varbinary 17 17 17 284 291 
Visa_Type varbinary 17 17 17 34 50 
Salary varbinary 17 17 17 284 291 
Department varbinary 33 33 33 66 50  
Bit vectors storages  0 4 37* 0 0 0 
Total Space required 202 206 239 89 1046 1023 
*37 = 20 bytes for storing bits as individual columns (we have 20 bits that require 20 columns of 
bit datatype) + 17 bytes for the encrypted index column 
 
 
Table 4.14 Bits’ storage requirements at the QM when the students’ table has a different 
number of tuples 
Model 
Bits’ storage requirement in bytes at the QM 






BVM 25,000 50,000 125,000 250,000 
BVSAC 0 0 0 0 




Figure 4.18 Comparison of the increase factor of encrypted table space among all systems. 
The increase factor (IF) =  (x-y) /y ,  where x= the space required to store the encrypted table, y= 
the space required to store the original (unencrypted) table.  
 
4.3.3 Factors that Increase the Efficiency of the Proposed Systems 
The number of partitions of a column plays a significant role in the efficiency of our proposed 
models. The more partitions there are, the fewer records are fetched from the cloud, and the 
efficiency of the models are influenced by the number of fetched encrypted records from the cloud. 
Since we encoded the tuples data into bits based on attribute partitioning, the bits searching is 
quick, and we are not concerned about the length of the PT, as this contributes to the reduction of 
the retrieved encrypted tuples from the cloud.  
Having a balanced tuples distribution among the partitions of every sensitive attribute is 
another challenge the data owner must account for. For illustration, one can suppose column A is 
partitioned into A1, A2, and A3; 50% of the records have their values of A fall under partition A1, 
30% fall under A2, and 20% are mapped to A3. If a select query executed to retrieve a record falls 
under A1, then 50% of the encrypted records are retrieved, while if the query result exists in the 
records mapped to A3, 20% of the encrypted records are fetched from the cloud. How to partition 
Original BVM BVSAC BVSIT OBT CBF
CryptD
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the columns of a table exceeds the scope of this dissertation; however, there is a penalty that studies 
have proposed to partition the columns, such as in [18], [20]. In [40], four methods can be used by 
the data owner to partition the columns into different partition domains, and each method works 
differently to divide each column into partitions based on its values. In future work, we will study 
this issue to design a partitioning algorithm to perform a fair partitioning for a table’s columns.  
4.4 Discussion 
As observed in the conducted experiments, we evaluated each proposed model; then, we compared 
the models in terms of query processing speed, computation overhead, storage requirements at the 
QM, and the cloud server. In the terms of the speed, the main cause of the delay was the amount 
of data to be decrypted; however, all the proposed prototypes intended to reduce the amount of 
retrieved encrypted data from the cloud to less than 35%. The cause of having a variation in a 
query processing speed is linked to how and where the BVs are stored. The delay of the BVM is 
mainly affected by the BV transportation from the hard drive HDD to the memory, while in the 
BVSIT, we avoided this matter by storing the BVs as an independent relational table in the cloud. 
In the BVSAC, the BVs were stored as an additional column in the same encrypted table in the 
cloud. For single users restricted by the allowed cloud space, the BVM is the optimal model 
because it requires the minimum additional space to manage and process the encrypted relational 
tables. However, the computation overhead and the memory consumption at the QM will likely be 
a problem if more than a user shares the same computation resource since the whole set of BVs of 
the table must be loaded to the main memory to execute a query. Thus, the BVM is not 
recommended for a multi-user system, and the optimal model is the BVSAC, followed by the 
BVSIT. The BVSAC experienced the shortest execution time, the second-lowest space 
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requirement in the cloud, and the lowest storage requirements at the QM, meaning it is suitable for 
both single- and multi-user systems.  
In terms of security, all the proposed models were at the highest security level. In the CBF, 
if the cloud providers did not collude, the security was high; however, it is not guaranteed, which 
downgrades the security level. In CryptDB, the authors suggested not putting back layers, which 
also reduces the security level. The OBT was secure if a randomized encryption algorithm was 
used; otherwise, the security level was reduced. For tables with excessive columns, such as 
thousands, the performance of the OBT would be jeopardized since the data of all the fields for 
each row are concatenated in one block. In the CBF, thousands of clouds were needed to store the 
extended columns, which makes this system impractical. In contrast, the proposed systems avoided 
such a problem because we performed cell-based encryption. We stored all the data on the same 
cloud server, which accelerated the query processing time for scalable databases. In Table 4.15, 
we  provide a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed systems in this 










Table 4.15 Summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the schemes evaluated in this dissertation. 





✓ High security level. 
✓ Has the least cloud space requirements among the 
proposed systems and the second-least among all systems. 
✓ Faster query processing with smaller databases. 
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption. 
✓ Keeps the same structure of the original table. 
✓ Uses one cloud to outsource the encrypted data. 
✓ The optimal choice for individual users who are limited by 
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time. 
 Higher overhead (in terms of computation and space) at the 
QM because of query translation. 
 Most of the computations are performed at the QM, which 
makes it unsuitable for multi-user systems.  







✓ High security level. 
✓ Has the least overhead (in terms of computation and space) 
at the QM. 
✓ Processes queries over larger databases faster than others. 
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption. 
✓ Keeps the same structure as the original table. 
✓ Uses one cloud to outsource the data. 
✓ Moves about 50% of the computation to the cloud server. 
✓ Is the optimal choice for dealing with huge databases in 
both single- and multi-user systems that are not limited by 
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time. 
✓ Has the least insertion and update latency, which makes it 
the best option for applications that might experience a 
high volume of these two operations.  
 Experiences a higher delay than other proposed systems when 
dealing with smaller databases.  
 Higher delay than other proposed systems in the join and 
intersection operators. 
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✓ High security level. 
✓ Works better with smaller databases. 
✓ Moves about 39% of the computation to the cloud server. 
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption. 
✓ Keeps the same structure as the original table. 
✓ Is the optimal choice for dealing with small databases in 
both single- and multi-user systems that are not limited by 
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time. 
 Experiences the highest delay in comparison to the other 
proposed systems when applied over large databases.  
 Has the highest insert and update delay. 
 Has the highest space requirement for the outsourced table 
among the other proposed systems. 
 Needs to communicate with the cloud server twice to process 
each query.  




 ✓ Requires the minimum space requirement among all 
systems. 
✓ Secure if a randomized encryption algorithm is used. 
✓ Uses one cloud to outsource the encrypted data. 
 Loses the main table structure. 
 Does not support multi-key-based encryption.  
 Works only for databases that have a small number of 
attributes. 
 An inaccurate update could happen if the value to be updated 
matches two or more sub-strings in the same row.  
 Does not support the intersection operator. 
 Does not support addition and multiplication (+,*). 




 ✓ Enables the cloud server to execute SQL operators over 
encrypted data. 
✓ Supports the functions of CryptDB and achieves processes 
queries faster than CryptDB. 
 Not practical for single users since N accounts in N different 
clouds need to be maintained. 
 Experiences an exponential delay growth as the number of 
predicates in a query increase. 
 The security level is downgraded if more than one cloud 
provider colludes. 
 Works only for tables with a small number of attributes.  
 Requires the most space among all the systems to outsource 
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 ✓ Moves over 91% of the computation overhead to the cloud 
server. 
✓ Supports most relational algebra operators.  
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption. 
✓ Supports single- and multi-user systems.  
 The security level is low because the secret key (sk) is 
passed to the cloud server. Although the server provider is 
trusted, they might be curious.  
 It is vulnerable to in-session attacks and inference attacks. 
 Authors suggest not to put back layers since that will cause 
computation overhead; however, that will downgrade the 
security level. 
 Requires the second-most amount of space among all the 
systems to outsource the encrypted table. 
 Works for small tables only, because if it is applied to larger 
tables, the computation delay will be incredibly high.  
 The data owner needs to install their own user-defined 
functions (UDFs) as an extension to the MySQL server in the 
cloud server; however, most cloud providers do not allow 
clients to install their own software in the cloud server. 
Therefore, CryptDB is not currently applicable in the real 





5 Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1 Summary 
Cloud computing is an attractive computing environment for all kinds of users and companies. 
But, privacy breaches, not only by malicious attackers but also by curious providers, is the 
downside of this type of service, because users lose access control over outsourced data. There are 
many solution for this problem and data encryption is the effective one. However, executing SQL 
queries over encrypted data is challenging, especially if a randomized encryption algorithm, like 
AES-CBC, is used for the encryption. In this research, we first introduce the QM, a trusted server, 
which works as an intermediate between the cloud server and user(s) and performs all the crypto 
processes. In addition, we design a novel indexing technique based on predefining partitions for 
each sensitive attribute, and then encode each tuple to bits, accordingly. The bits are used to 
retrieve candidate tuples for a specific query that minimize the range of the retrieved encrypted 
tuples. Based on this encoding scheme, we proposed three different secure systems that each use 
a different way to store and maintain the index data (i.e., the bit vectors [BVs]) either locally at 
the QM or by migrating the BVs to the cloud sever. For each proposed prototype, we design 
different algorithms to accomplish query execution of different SQL relational algebra operators, 
and we make it resistant to attack scenarios, such as inference attacks. We test our models by 
implementing them and comparing their performance with state-of-the-art systems like CryptDB. 
We evaluate them in terms of their execution time requirement and space requirements. We find 
that the proposed systems require both less execution time and space when compared with most 





5.2 Future work 
As a future work, we aim to extend the proposed prototypes to support addition and multiplication 
operations. That could be achieved by using a different secure algorithm to encrypt the numeric 
attributes. Also, since the number of nodes (number of partitions) in the PT used by proposed 
systems in this dissertation impacts the efficiency of the developed systems, we aim to develop a 
fair partitioning algorithm that can divide sensitive attributes into n partitions where n is a threshold 
defined by system administrator. This would allow faster query processing speed by restricting the 
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